



Glossary

Peace Operations

*Your Gateway to
Peace Operations*



Dear reader,

We are pleased to present a compact and handy guide to the core concepts in the field of international peace operations.

Missions run by the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other regional organizations have become a standard instrument for preventing and de-escalating conflicts, monitoring cease-fires, and building lasting peace. Given that the international community will continue to find itself confronted with violent conflicts, ZIF will continue working on best practices for peace operations and enhance international cooperation in this field.

As in any other field, peace operations have their own jargon. This booklet uses short texts, graphics, and images to explain thirty central terms and concepts commonly encountered in peacekeeping and crisis management. We have deliberately kept it compact, so that the booklet fits easily in your jacket pocket or handbag to make sure you are always kept well-informed.

We hope you find our glossary useful and informative.

Almut Wieland-Karimi

Director of the Center for International Peace Operations

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Brahimi Report



The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is the most comprehensive analysis to date of the weaknesses of UN → *Peace Operations* and the need for reforms. It was prepared in 2000 by a panel of experts appointed by the UN Secretary-General and chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. Its recommendations launched an internal reform process at the UN. The latest initiative in this process was the → *New Horizon* strategy document published in July 2009.

Links and literature

UN (2000): Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809)

UN (2006): UN Reform Agenda 2010 (A/60/696)

UN DPKO (2009): A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping

Civil-Military Cooperation

CIMIC

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Civil-military cooperation describes activities such as building or repairing schools and distributing aid undertaken by the armed forces in order to increase the local population's acceptance of a military operation. Civilian aid organizations criticize what they see as a dangerous confusion of military and humanitarian activities. This concept must be distinguished from → *Civil-Military Coordination*, whose aim is to coordinate civilian and military actors.



Civil-Military Coordination

CMCoord

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Humanitarian crisis operations and multidimensional peace operations demand close coordination between humanitarian and military actors in order to ensure a sensible division of labor, efficient use of resources, and avoid duplication. The CMCoord concept was developed by the UN to improve coordination while at the same time upholding humanitarian principles. The core areas are the streamlining of planning processes, improving information flows, and the division of labor. Within the UN the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is responsible for developing and implementing the CMCoord concept.

Civilian Headline Goal

CHG

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The Civilian Headline Goal adopted by the EU in 2004 defines targets for civilian crisis management capacities under the Common Security and Defense Policy (→ *CSDP Missions*). The ultimate objective is to speed up deployment of civilian personnel and enable the EU to conduct several different long-term operations in parallel. The member states themselves are responsible for creating the required capacities. Targets have been agreed in the following priority sectors:

- → *Civilian Police* and → *Rule of Law*;
- Civil administration;
- Civil protection;
- Monitoring missions;
- Support for EU special representatives.

Links and literature

EU (2004): Consolidated Civilian Headline Goal 2008

Civilian Police

CIVPOL

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In peace operations international police personnel support the (re-)establishment of the host countries' law enforcement agencies, especially as trainers and advisers. The aim is to put the local police in a position to guarantee public order in accordance with the principles of → *Rule of Law*. Except in missions with an → *Executive Mandate*, international police do not exercise executive functions such as investigating crimes or arresting suspects. → *Formed Police Units* play a special role.

Civilian Response Team

CRT

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Civilian response teams deployed by the EU Council Secretariat are an instrument of civilian crisis management in the CSDP (→ *CSDP Missions*). Their tasks include:

- Carrying out assessment and fact-finding missions in crisis situations;
- Helping to prepare operation plans;
- Ensuring a rapid operational presence on the ground;
- Supporting the initial phase of civilian missions.

The number of members and their expertise varies according to the task of the CRT. They are assembled from a pool of experts in the fields of justice, administration, logistics, management, and police. All the experts in the pool (currently ca. 100) have been selected and trained by EU member states according to agreed criteria. EU civilian response teams have already been deployed in Afghanistan and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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CSDP Missions

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The Balkan wars of the 1990s showed the necessity to develop new EU crisis management instruments. EU peace operations are today a central component of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The first was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) in 2003. Another twenty-one missions have followed to date, of which six were military and fifteen civilian. At the beginning of 2010 there were twelve CSDP missions in the field, more than ever before.

Links and literature

EU Institute for Security Studies (2009): European Security and Defence Policy: the first ten years (1999–2009)
Latest information on CSDP missions: www.csdpmap.eu and www.isis-europe.org

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| Since | Mission | Abbreviation |
|---------|--|--|
| 01/2003 | EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina | EUPM |
| 12/2004 | EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina | EUFOR Althea |
| 02/2005 | EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq | EUJUST LEX |
| 05/2005 | EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | EUSEC RD Congo |
| 11/2005 | EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point | EUBAM Rafah |
| 01/2006 | EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories | EUPOL COPPS |
| 06/2007 | EU Police Mission in Afghanistan | EUPOL Afghanistan |
| 07/2007 | EU Police Mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo | EUPOL RD Congo |
| 02/2008 | EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo | EULEX Kosovo |
| 06/2008 | EU Mission in Support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau | EU SSR Guinea-Bissau |
| 10/2008 | EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia | EUMM |
| 12/2008 | EU Naval Operation Against Piracy | EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta |

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DDR

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Disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants and reintegrating them into society is a precondition for lasting security after the end of an armed conflict. Since the late 1990s DDR has been one of the standard tasks of multidimensional → *Peace Operations*. The military component of a mission is responsible for disarmament and demobilization, while reintegration is the task of civilian mission personnel working in close cooperation with local actors and development organizations.



Links and literature

UN DDR Resource Center: www.unddr.org

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UNMIL WILL RECEIVE YOUR GUN AT
DISARMAMENT SITE.



SOME PEOPLE WILL TALK TO YOU TO
FORGET ABOUT FIGHTING AND BE A GOOD
PERSON FOR LIBERIA. YOU WILL CHOOSE
WHICH TRADE YOU WANT TO LEARN.

DPKO/DFS


Department of Peacekeeping Operations/
Department of Field Support

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The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been responsible for planning, and managing all UN peace operations since 1992. In June 2007 the DPKO was divided in two in response to the growing challenges of running increasingly complex operations. The new Department of Field Support (DFS) is responsible for logistics, finance, and personnel, while the DPKO remains in charge of strategy development, operational planning, and leadership of UN field missions. Each department is headed by an Under-Secretary-General.

Links and literature

DPKO/DFS website: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping



Executive Mandate/ Transitional Administration

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→ *Peace Operations* with an executive mandate take on sovereign responsibilities in the country of deployment – from air traffic control to customs inspections. As well as fulfilling these political and administrative duties, the transitional administration also works to establish local structures that will ultimately be capable of taking over these functions. The UN Security Council has to date approved only three such comprehensive mandates, in response to the complete breakdown of local institutions:


- UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium), 1996–1998;
- UNTAET (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor), 1999–2002;
- UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo), since 1999.

Exit Strategy

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An exit strategy defines benchmarks whose fulfillment indicates that a → *Peace Operation* can be wound down or withdrawn. These benchmarks should be agreed upon between the local and international actors at an early stage. Although there are no universal benchmarks, the UN name a series of indicators that denote progress in peace consolidation:

- Permanent end of violent conflict and human rights violations;
- Successful disarmament of ex-combatants (→ *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*);
- Establishment of public order by effective local security forces under civilian control (→ *Security Sector Reform*);
- Restoration of a functioning independent judicial system (→ *Rule of Law*);
- Return of refugees;
- Nationwide rebuilding of health and education systems;



- Onset of economic recovery;
- Establishment of legitimate state and political institutions, including democratic political parties and successful elections.

Links and literature

Report of the UN Secretary-General (2001): No exit without strategy (S/2001/394)

Formed Police Unit


FPU

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Formed police units in peace operations normally comprise about 120 officers from a single contributing state, who are trained and equipped to respond to violent demonstrations and unrest. They fill a crucial gap between the capabilities of the military component and that of CIVPOL (→ *Civilian Police*). The paramilitary police forces of several European states have proven especially suited to this task, notably the

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French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Guardia Civil. Formed police units were first deployed in 1999 in Kosovo and in East Timor. Their main responsibilities are:

- Protecting mission personnel and facilities;
- Assisting local police forces to maintain public order;
- Building local FPU capacities (training, advice).

Hybrid Mission


In a hybrid mission two or more international or regional organizations work together on the ground under joint leadership. The only current example is the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Hybrid missions must be distinguished from operations where



- one organization succeeds another in the same area (sequential missions, e.g. the EU's EUFOR Tchad/RCA which preceded the UN's MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic);
- two organizations operate at the same time but each is under its own autonomous leadership (parallel missions, e.g. NATO's ISAF and the UN's UNAMA in Afghanistan).

One potential benefit of a hybrid mission is the combination of the local legitimacy of one partner with the greater resources of another. However, they present great challenges in terms of the participants' ability and willingness to cooperate.

Ideal structure of a hybrid mission




Integrated Mission

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The broad spectrum of tasks of today's UN peace operations requires many actors to work together. In the UN system this involves not only the military, police, and civilian components of the mission, but also other members of the UN family such as UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, WFP, FAO, UNHCHR, and OCHA, as well as their respective implementation partners. The greatest challenge in planning and conducting operations is coordinating all these partners. In order to bring about improvements in this area, in 2004 the UN introduced the concept of the Integrated Mission, the heart of which is a planning process that brings together → *DPKO* and *DFS* with representatives from UN organizations working in the fields of humanitarian aid and development (UN Country Team). A shared strategic vision and coordinated mission goals will enable existing resources and expertise to be used to maximum effect.

Levels and pillars of a UN mission

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The concept of “local ownership” has a long history in development work under labels such as “empowerment” or “participatory development.” It has become increasingly important in → *Peace Operations* since the 1990s as missions have expanded their peacebuilding role. Local ownership describes the goal as well as the process of gradual transfer of responsibility to local actors, which is a fundamental precondition for sustainable → *Peacebuilding* and therefore a central component of the → *Exit Strategy* of any peace operation.

Links and literature

ZIF Local Ownership Project: www.zif-berlin.org/en/projects/local-ownership-project.html

In July 2009 the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) (→ *DPKO/DFS*) published a joint reform proposal entitled “A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.” It calls for a new “global partnership” between the UN Secretariat, member states, and the Security Council to overcome the growing gap between the need for UN peace operations and the resources available to conduct them (→ *Peacekeeping Overstretch*). The document sees a need for action in three areas: planning and managing missions, delivering results in the field, and building capacity within the UN.

Links and literature

Center on International Cooperation (2009): Building on Brahimi
ZIF Policy Briefing (2010): New Horizon

Peace Enforcement

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The term “peace enforcement” denotes the use of military force to restore peace under the authority of the UN Security Council, as stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (→ *UN Charter: Chapters VI and VII*). The Security Council must first identify a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). Another international organization or a group of member states (“coalition of the willing”) can be charged with conducting military operations. North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990 are two examples of peace enforcement by the UN.

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Peace Operations/ Peacekeeping

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The term “peacekeeping” was originally used to describe the deployment of unarmed military observers or lightly armed peacekeeping forces (“blue helmets”) to support a cease-fire or peace agreement. Although this is probably the UN’s best known instrument, it is not actually defined in the UN Charter. The precedent on which all subsequent peacekeeping operations were based was UNEF, deployed during the Suez crisis of 1956. Since then peacekeeping has experienced quantitative and qualitative change:

- growing circle of actors (besides UN also EU, NATO, OSCE, AU);
- increasing number of missions;
- broader spectrum of tasks;
- greater specialization of personnel.

In order to reflect these developments and draw a distinction from traditional peacekeeping, the term “peace operations” is more commonly used today.

Four Generations of Peace Operations

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| Generation | Typical tasks | Personnel |
|---|--|--|
| 1 st generation: Traditional peacekeeping (from 1948) | Static monitoring of cease-fires and peace agreements Creating a buffer zone between conflicting parties | Predominantly unarmed military observers or lightly armed troops |
| 2 nd generation: Multidimensional peacekeeping (from late 1980s) | Establish temporary security presence Simultaneously tackle causes of conflict, e.g. by supporting: → <i>DDR</i> , → <i>SSR</i> , → <i>Rule of Law</i> , and elections | Military, police, civilian personnel |
| 3 rd generation: Robust peacekeeping (since early 1990s) | Tasks as 2 nd generation plus use of force to defend mandate (→ <i>Robust Peacekeeping</i>) | Military, police, civilian personnel |
| 4 th generation: (since 1992) | Tasks as 3 rd generation plus temporary executive powers (→ <i>Executive Mandate</i>) | Military, police, civilian personnel |

Links and literature

UN DPKO (2008): Capstone Doctrine – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines

Post-conflict societies are at great risk of relapsing into chaos. In the 1992 “Agenda for Peace,” former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali coined the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding” to describe measures designed to consolidate the peace and prevent the recurrence of violence. Because peacebuilding must begin as quickly as possible after the end of an armed conflict, modern peace operations combine peacekeeping measures with peacebuilding elements. This exceptionally complex and time-consuming process demands coordinated action by international actors as well as the early participation of local partners (→ *Local Ownership*). In 2005 the UN founded the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to improve coordination and put financing on a solid footing.

Peacebuilding priorities

Basic safety and security (→ *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*, → *Security Sector Reform*, → *Rule of Law*);

Political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation;

Provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education;

Restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance;

Economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

Abridged from UN Security Council (2009): Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict (A/63/881-S/2009/304)

Links and literature

Report of the Secretary-General (1992): An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277-S/24111)

Peacekeeping Overstretch

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Between 2000 and 2010 the number of UN peacekeepers rose from about 20,000 to 117,000 and the UN's peacekeeping budget increased almost fivefold to \$7.8 billion. Many experts believe that the limits of troop-contributing states, donors, and the UN's administrative capacity have been reached. The causes behind this development include the growing number of large missions in regions with weak infrastructure, increasingly complex tasks, longer deployments, the global financial crisis, and the slow pace of reform of the UN. A number of solutions are proposed in the UN's → *New Horizon* document.

Petersberg Tasks

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The Petersberg Tasks adopted at the 1992 summit meeting of the Western European Union (WEU) comprise:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- Peacekeeping tasks (→ *Peace Operations/Peacekeeping*);
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (→ *Peace Enforcement*).

The EU took over the Petersberg Tasks in May 1999 under the Treaty of Amsterdam. Today they form a core component of the CSDP (→ *CSDP Missions*).

Protection of Civilians

PoC

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Deliberate attacks on civilians are a growing problem of modern conflicts. In response, the UN explicitly allowed the UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) and INTERFET (East Timor) missions in 1999 to use force to protect civilians under immediate threat. Since then this power has been included in almost all mission mandates, but the UN still lacks a precise definition and operational guidelines for the protection of civilians. This makes it difficult to implement the policy on the ground and leads to confusion with the related concept of → *Responsibility to Protect*. Whereas responsibility to protect is a recent norm of international law, protection of civilians is a cross-cutting task for UN personnel in peace operations.



Responsibility to Protect

RtoP or R2P

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The concept “responsibility to protect” stresses the duty of nation-states – and where they fail to meet their obligations, the international community – to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, if necessary through use of force. But this new norm of international law is controversial. Some see it as encouraging interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states, while humanitarian actors criticize the loss of distinction between military and humanitarian interventions (see also → *Protection of Civilians*).

Links and literature

Website of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect: www.responsibilitytoprotect.org

ICISS Report (2001): The Responsibility to Protect

Robust Peacekeeping

Unarmed military observers or lightly armed troops quickly meet their limits where their presence is contested or local forces have an interest in continuing the conflict. This became very apparent in the 1990s in the operations in Bosnia and Somalia. The UN Security Council therefore began explicitly empowering peace operations to use force to enforce their mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (→ *UN Charter: Chapters VI and VII*). But in contrast to → *Peace Enforcement*, the agreement of the main parties remains a precondition for a “robust” operation (→ *UN Peacekeeping Principles*). Most current UN peace operations operate under a robust mandate.

Current UN operations with robust mandate

| | |
|----------|---|
| UNMIK | Kosovo (06/1999) |
| MONUC | Democratic Republic of the Congo (11/1999) |
| UNMIL | Liberia (10/2003) |
| UNOCI | Côte d'Ivoire (04/2004) |
| MINUSTAH | Haiti (06/2004) |
| MINURCAT | Central African Republic and Chad (10/2007) |
| UNAMID | Sudan/Darfur (01/2008) |

The date in parentheses indicates the beginning of the operation (month/year).

Rule of Law

RoL

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If post-conflict societies are to attain lasting stability the enforcement of the rule of law is vital. Programs promoting the rule of law – in the local justice system, the police force, and the prison system – therefore belong among the core tasks of multidimensional peace operations. Typical measures include training judges, prosecutors, police, and correctional staff, advising local politicians and jurists on constitutional matters, and setting up independent courts. Where a mission possesses an executive mandate tasks such as law-enforcement can also be undertaken by international personnel.

Links and literature

Guidance Note of the Secretary-General (2008): UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance

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Rules of Engagement

RoE

46



The rules of engagement define the frame of reference for the activities of the military component of a → *Peace Operation*,

in particular the conditions under which force may be used. The rules of engagement are prepared in close coordination between the international organization conducting the mission (UN, EU, NATO, etc.), the troop-contributing countries, and the country of deployment. Each organization involved has its own set of regulations on which the new rules of engagement for each operation are based.

Security Sector Reform

SSR

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Effective reform of the security sector in accordance with the principles of the rule of law is a precondition for sustainable → *Peacebuilding* in post-conflict societies. Depending on the definition used, the security sector comprises the military, police, and intelligence services, as well as parts of the justice sector. SSR activities in UN missions concentrate especially on the police and justice sector, ranging from advice on legal reforms and training measures to technical and financial support for local security forces.



Status of Forces Agreement/ Status of Mission Agreement

SOFA/SOMA

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The status of forces/mission agreement governing the legal position of troops and civilian personnel on deployment is concluded between the international organization deploying the mission and the host government. Legal immunity for international personnel is a central aspect of such agreements, along with provisions relating to freedom of movement, taxes, customs, immigration controls, radio frequencies, and permission to wear uniforms and carry weapons.

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UN Charter: Chapters VI and VII

50

All member states of the UN are obliged to seek a “*peaceful settlement*” to all disputes. Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Articles 33–38) describes the role of the UN Security Council in such settlements, without giving it the right to make a binding ruling. If, however, the Security Council determines the existence of “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, it can under Chapter VII (Articles 39–51), authorize coercive action including the use of military force. Military action under Chapter VII and self-defense (Article 51) are the only occasions where military force may legitimately be used in international relations.

Traditional peacekeeping operations (→ *Peace Operations*) were initially understood as activities under Chapter VI, with the use of force permitted only for self-defense. But following negative experiences –



especially in Somalia and the Balkans – the Security Council has begun protecting its missions with robust mandates under Chapter VII (→ *Robust Peacekeeping*).

Links and literature

Charter of the United Nations: www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml

UN Peacekeeping Principles

Consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force remain the basic pillars of UN peacekeeping. However, the changing nature of peacekeeping environments has led to an evolution in the understanding of these principles. An increasing number of conflicts involve large numbers of parties that are often internally divided. In addition, many armed groups that attack civilians are not under the control of any of the main parties. Obtaining the agreement of all parties and complete non-use of force except for self-defense are impracticable in such environments. As a consequence, modern peace operations only require the consent of the main parties and are allowed to use “all necessary means” in defense of their mandates (→ *Robust Peacekeeping*).

Links and literature

UN DPKO (2008): Capstone Doctrine – United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| AU | African Union |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CHG | Civilian Headline Goal |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation |
| CIVPOL | Civilian Police |
| CMCoord | Civil-Military Coordination |
| CMO | Civil-Military Operation |
| CMS | Chief of Mission Support |
| COS | Chief of Staff |
| CPU | Civilian Police Unit |
| CRT | Civilian Response Team |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defense Policy |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration |
| DFS | Department of Field Support |
| DMS | Director of Mission Support |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| DSG | Deputy Secretary-General |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| ECHO | European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ESDP | European Security and Defense Policy |
| EU | European Union |
| EU SSR Guinea-Bissau | European Union Mission in Support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau |

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| EUBAM Rafah | European Union Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point |
| EUFOR Althea | European Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| EUFOR Tchad/RCA | European Union Force Chad/CAR |
| EUJUST LEX | European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq |
| EULEX Kosovo | European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo |
| EUMM | European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia |
| EUNAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta | European Union Naval Operation Against Piracy |
| EUPM | European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| EUPOL Afghanistan | European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan |
| EUPOL COPPS | European Union Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories |
| EUPOL RD Congo | European Union Police Mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| EUSEC RD Congo | European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| FC | Force Commander |
| FPU | Formed Police Units |
| HC | Humanitarian Coordinator |
| HOM | Head of Mission |
| HOMC | Head of Military Component |

| | |
|----------|---|
| HOPC | Head of Police Component |
| ICISS | International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IMPP | Integrated Mission Planning Process |
| IMTF | Integrated Mission Task Force |
| INTERFET | International Force East Timor |
| IOT | Integrated Operational Team |
| IPBS | Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| ISS | Integrated Support Service |
| JSR | Joint Special Representative |
| MINURCAT | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad) |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti) |
| MONUC | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo) |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development |

| | |
|----------|---|
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PBC | Peacebuilding Commission |
| PCC | Police Contributing Countries |
| PKF | Peacekeeping Force |
| PoC | Protection of Civilians |
| R2P/RtoP | Responsibility to Protect |
| RC | Resident Coordinator |
| RoE | Rules of Engagement |
| RoL | Rule of Law |
| SOFA | Status of Force Agreement |
| SOMA | Status of Mission Agreement |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Countries |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMA | United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan |
| UNAMID | African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Program |
| UNEF | UN Emergency Force |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund |

| | |
|--------|--|
| UNMIK | United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo |
| UNMIL | United Nations Mission in Liberia |
| UNOCI | United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire |
| UNTAES | United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium |
| UNTAET | United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor |
| USG | Under-Secretary-General |
| WEU | Western European Union |
| WFP | World Food Program |
| WHO | World Health Organization |
| ZIF | Center for International Peace Operations |



ZIF was founded in 2002 by the German government and parliament to strengthen civilian capacities for international peace operations. The growing complexity of peace operations means that rapid deployment of professional personnel is a key factor for success. The Center's core mandate is to train and recruit civilian personnel and prepare analyses and concepts for peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and civilian conflict management. ZIF works closely together with the Foreign Ministry and is responsible in particular for Germany's UN, EU, and OSCE operations. Our integrated approach, bringing together training, human resources, and analysis under one roof, has gained worldwide recognition as an example to follow. Through joint projects with international partners we work to expand peacekeeping capacities and advance the theory and practice of peace operations.

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The Director of the Center is Almut Wieland-Karimi.

If you feel that a vital term is missing in this glossary please e-mail us at glossar@zif-berlin.org or send a letter to our Berlin address.

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