

# International and Local Policing in Peace Operations

*Lessons Learned and the Way Forward to Integrated Approaches*

## Report

8th International Berlin Workshop

Berlin, December 14 – 16, 2006



Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (ZIF)  
Center for International Peace Operations

# **International and Local Policing in Peace Operations**

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Report by  
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## Introduction

In United Nations as well as European Union peace operations, the police component has become a strategic element for stabilizing war-torn countries and initiating a process of peace-building. The police have increasingly been charged with a broad range of tasks, such as the establishment of public order or strengthening the rule of law and democratic governance; in fulfilling these tasks, the police can play either an advisory or an executive role. Rebuilding local police capacities and combating organized crime are activities of no less importance. Given this range of tasks, policing in peace operations is an extremely complex undertaking and while much has been achieved in the past few years, a number of problems and unresolved issues remain.

In view of the strategic importance of police in peace operations, the *German Federal Foreign Office* and the *Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF)* agreed to make

"International and Local Policing in Peace Operations.  
Lessons Learned and the Way Forward to Integrated Approaches"

the topic of the 8<sup>th</sup> International Berlin Workshop. The Workshop was held in Berlin from December 14 to 16 2006 and brought together about fifty leading experts—police, civilian and military—from the field as well as experts from national governments, the relevant international organizations, research bodies and other non-governmental institutions.

The Workshop addressed a number of key issues with regard to policing, in particular:

- cooperation, command and control arrangements as well as the division of labor between military, police and civilian rule of law actors, particularly in the start-up phase of a peace operation;
- the integration of police work into broader efforts related to good governance and the rule of law;
- approaches and lessons learned with regard to building local police capabilities, engaging local actors and ensuring sustainability;
- improving those international police capabilities available for deployment.

The emphasis of the Workshop was on fostering a thorough, comparative debate based on experiences gained in a number of peace operations and in a variety of functional areas in policing. Methods applied, problems unsolved and lessons learned in the various cases were thoroughly discussed with the aim of finding more effective ways of planning and implementing policing tasks. Participants shared their wealth of experience in an admirably frank and constructive manner.

The present Report summarizes the contributions and discussions of the 8<sup>th</sup> International Berlin Workshop. The executive summary provides an overview of key issues, lessons learned and recommendations.

*Dr. Winrich Kühne*

Director ZIF

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## List of Berlin Workshop Reports

- "Organized Crime as an Obstacle to Successful Peacebuilding. Lessons learned from the Balkans, Afghanistan and West Africa," Report on the 7<sup>th</sup> International Berlin Workshop, December 11-13, 2003.
- "The Brahimi Report. Overcoming the North-South Divide," Report on the 6th International Berlin Workshop, June 29–30, 2001, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "The Security Council and the G 8 in the New Millennium—Who is in Charge of International Peace and Security?," Report on the 5th Berlin Workshop, June 30–July 1, 2000, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "The United Nations and Regional Security Arrangements—Towards more Effective Task-sharing and Cooperation," Report on 4th Berlin Workshop, June 24–26, 1999, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "Consolidating Peace Through Practical Disarmament Measure and Control of Small Arms—From Civil War to Civil Society," Report on the 3rd Berlin Workshop, July 2–4, 1998, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "Improving African and International Capabilities for Preventing and Resolving Violent Conflict—The Great Lakes Region Crisis," Report on the 2nd Berlin Workshop, July 3–5, 1997, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "The Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding—Planning, Coordination and Funding in the Twilight Zone," Report on Follow-up Workshop in New York, March 10, 1997, Winrich Kühne (ed.).
- "Winning the Peace—Concept and Lessons Learned of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding," Report on the 1st Berlin Workshop, July 4–6, 1996, Winrich Kühne (ed.).



# Executive Summary

## Managing Complexity through Integration

Policing in peace operations takes place in increasingly complex environments. Most operations today are deployed into so called “failed states” which can no longer fulfill core functions such as the provision of security and public order under the rule of law. The challenge of rebuilding failed states can only be met through the integration of the activities of various actors, including the police, into one overarching strategy. The work of police components must firmly be placed into the broader context of reforming the security sector and re-establishing the rule of law.

As several participants stressed the example of Afghanistan shows the risk involved if single initiatives do not follow a joint strategy:

*As part of the Bonn Agreement, individual nations were assigned lead-nation status for certain functional areas of reform without the benefit of an overarching structure. A coordinated, multilateral framework for security sector reform and improved governance was lacking. The four-legged stool of security sector reform—justice, penal, military and police—wobbled from the uneven level of commitment and development of each respective sector.*

Much more effort and dialogue between the key actors involved in peace operations are therefore needed to establish and operationalize joint strategies!

## Division of Labor Needs Improvement

A sufficiently clear understanding of the division of labor between police and military components is still missing. At the same time overlap of responsibilities, both on the level of day-to-day cooperation in the field and on the political level, will continue to be inevitable due to the unpredictable and often dangerous environment in to which peace operations are deployed:

*Too often one hears the phrase ‘that’s not a job for the military’, particularly in national capitals where there is an understandable but in this case misguided resistance to having soldiers involved in law enforcement. In practice in post-conflict societies, the fledgling local*

*police require an aggressive back up in law enforcement by the international military presence.*

There are, however, a number of serious practical obstacles to cooperation in the field. These include differences in personnel capacity, deployment timelines and equipment as well as in mandate, organizational culture and working style. Obviously, there are also clear limitations to the tasks that the military can and should perform:

*While the military in Afghanistan focused on direct action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, they were neither trained nor organized to deal with the vast array of public order and governance reform tasks required to stabilize the country and facilitate sustained reform.*

Suggestions for improving police-military cooperation included developing procedures for joint planning, creating joint structures such as command posts, headquarters or crisis management centers as well as joint police-military training. Efforts to enhance cooperation and interoperability need to start long before deployment.

### **Closing the “Deployment Gap”**

Problems resulting from the “deployment gap” were of particular concern to participants: the military component arrives on the ground immediately after mission start-up but often has to wait for months before the international community manages to mobilize the police element. As a consequence, a so-called “enforcement gap” almost inevitably develops and the failure to provide public security risks a relapse into lawlessness, revenge killings, and finally open conflict.

A robust but non-lethal enforcement capacity is therefore needed during the critical start-up phase of an intervention. Most participants felt that Gendarmerie-type police units with a military character, as used on numerous previous occasions such as in the Balkans, are best suited to fill the enforcement gap:

*Formed Police Units (FPUs) are capable of quick deployment but also robust enough to survive in the initial stages of an operation. Due to their hybrid character, they are particularly well suited to work alongside the military and can also serve as a bridging function to facilitate the transition between military and police once the security situation has stabilized.*

However, of all international police deployed today, half are already serving within FPU and it is questionable whether overall capacity allows for a substantial increase of this ratio. Frequently, therefore, the only actor able to guarantee law and order at the outset is the military. In these cases, transfer of primacy for law enforcement back to the police must happen as soon as possible particularly in areas such as criminal investigations:

*We know from experience in Kosovo, among others, that the military is simply not trained to interview witnesses and collect evidence that can later form the basis of court cases. However, even if it will be possible in the future to deploy FPUs from the very beginning of a mission, it is not guaranteed that the necessary investigative skill will be available as not all formed units contain the necessary specialists.*

Several organizations, like the UN and the EU, are stepping up efforts to speed up overall police deployment. The EU is focusing on bringing the police deployment timeline of 30 days closer to the 10 day timeline of the Battle Groups. At the end of the day, however, *member states* will have to ensure that conditions facilitating speedy deployment of qualified personnel are in place.

### **Command and Control**

Unity of command within peace operations is a precondition for success despite the problems associated with a unified command chain in practice:

*In the early days of police participation in peace operations the police was deployed under the military force commander—a concept that did not meet widespread approval among the police at the time. Experience in Kosovo has furthermore shown, so one participant argued, that unified chains of command lead de facto to military dominance over the police since the military was generally unwilling to take orders from civilian bodies.*

At the *strategic* level, command and control must rest with the SRSG—or with an equivalent civilian functionary in non-UN operations—who is politically responsible for the implementation of the peace process. Only he or she must decide whether, when, and how to use force or any other kind of enforcement measures by either the police or the military.

At the *tactical* level, the “Green Box / Blue Box” concept originated by NATO's Multinational Specialized Unit in Bosnia in 1997 allocating command and control in certain parts of the mission area respectively to the military and to the

police has proven to be very useful. International organizations should adopt this model and teach it in their respective training courses in order to enhance interoperability of police and military units from a wide variety of contributing nations.

### **Training and Skill Profile of International Police Officers**

It is widely acknowledged that international police officers in peace operations have to receive the best possible preparation given the complexity of the task they have to perform. Nevertheless, in practice the amount and quality of pre-mission training in different contributing nations is still very uneven:

*Some of the major contributors in the UN system are deploying police officers that are not prepared to undertake the duties assigned to them, have not received any pre-deployment training, do not know much about the conflict and geographical area they are deployed to, and might in some cases not even be of sufficient health. These individuals do not only constitute a problem in terms of performance but also become a liability for security reasons.*

International organizations should make pre-mission training mandatory and facilitate the standardization of training curricula in order to improve the overall quality and level of preparedness of international police personnel. Furthermore, the unequal distribution of skill profiles among international officers leads to a shortage of certain key specialists which affects the performance of police missions:

*It is not that UNMIK police has too few officers or that they are not professionally qualified. What is lacking, however, is a sufficient number of officers with certain specific qualifications, most importantly at the moment strategic planners and experienced criminal investigators.*

The shortage of experienced planning experts was in fact described as “the Achilles’ heel of all international police operations” by a senior expert. Low numbers of planning experts in national police forces cause reluctance by contributing nations to deploy these key officers abroad. In addition, national recruitment systems, based on personal willingness and availability, do not give due consideration to staffing needs on the ground:



*I have told our partners many times: 'I don't need an extra 20 patrol officers, I need one planning expert.' Yet I get sent more patrol officers.*

The establishment of permanent headquarters with integrated planning staffs for police missions by international organizations was proposed as a measure to address the shortage of planning experts. Lengthening the tour of duty might seem another possibility to alleviate the shortage of specialists. However, this might increase contributing countries' unwillingness to provide specialists already in short supply nationally.

### **A Key Dilemma: Quantity and Quality of Local Police Officers**

Particularly during the early post-conflict period, the short-term need for a considerable *quantity* of local police officers on the ground clashes with long-term considerations for high *quality* policing. The first calls for a rapid vetting and training programs, the second for a more thorough approach. Training programs for new recruits of 20-24 weeks at a police academy followed by an equally long period of field training were seen as a basic requirement for a professional police service:

*Sometimes officers receive only six or eight weeks of training before we put them out on the street, strap a gun to their side and expect them to respond properly to all kinds of emergencies. In addition, as soon as the number of local officers has reached a quantity deemed acceptable by the political leadership, the number of experienced international officers in the mission will start to be reduced. In my opinion, we are asking for major problems if we do continue to operate like that.*

Other experts suggested that the precarious security situation combined with a lack of personnel may necessitate a shortened training regime. Some even argued that the military, with its larger resource and personnel base, needs to be involved in training local police in such acute emergencies. Others maintained that soldiers were unsuitable police trainers. Creating a "paramilitary" police force will lead to problems in the areas of community relations and accountability. This was a particularly controversial with regard to the "Auxiliary Police" which the U.S. military is building up in Afghanistan.

The use of private contractors for training delivery was also a contentious issue. In addition to the general question whether any aspect of public

security should be placed in the hands of private, profit-driven companies, their services were described as often sub-standard and overpriced:

*I have some misgivings about the quality of the training provided by a number of these contractors. While the technical aspects of the courses are satisfactory, no efforts are made to improve the basic education of the recruits. Yet given the backgrounds of most young men and women entering the Afghan police force, this is precisely what is needed.*

Finally, poor conditions of service and in particular low salaries make it difficult to attract and retain well educated men and women for the local police service. In many cases individuals leave the police service after having been trained at the expense of the international community for more profitable jobs in the private sector. Low salaries furthermore give rise to corruption and organized crime. Despite the financial constraints of post-conflict societies and the dependency on donors that excessive entitlement programs for public employees might create, appropriate salaries were seen as a precondition for sustainability.

### **Local Ownership in Policing**

While all Workshop participants agreed on the vital importance of local ownership, its successful implementation remains an unsolved problem and is associated with a number of dilemmas. The *first* dilemma lies in identifying suitable local partners. Local elites might be unacceptable due to their previous involvement in the conflict; reform-oriented groups often have no real power base in the population. Furthermore, the international community might not be free in its choice of partners as rebel groups with a record of human rights violations may be part of the formal peace agreement and will need to be accommodated in the peace process.

A *second* dilemma is whether local counterparts should be involved from the early stages in defining the policy goals of a reform process or only later, during its implementation. Presenting locals with a finished list of measures might lead to lack of participation in the reform process and the design of measures inappropriate to the host country. Involving local actors in setting the reform agenda, however, can also have severe drawbacks:

*What if we don't agree with their choices for the future of their country? What if the international community can see that certain policies adopted by local partners have no chance of success? Should time*

*and money be wasted in the name of local ownership or should the internationals intervene and overrule their local partners?*

The *third* dilemma is caused by the fact that local owners are not an amorphous mass. The international presence will often be faced with differing interests of various groups and the sensitive decision which one to co-operate with: the largest group, the most vulnerable group, or the one most inclined to collaborate although it may be of marginal political relevance?

*Ideally, local owners are both willing and able. If they are willing but unable, institution and capacity building measures must be implemented. The way to address able but unwilling local counterparts is through a political process that builds a consensus for reform, by persuasion and positive incentives if possible but some form of pressure may well be necessary. Local actors that are neither able nor willing obviously pose the greatest challenge.*

A clear lesson with regard to local ownership is the necessity to start early—and to be patient. More creativity is needed in approaches to engaging local owners. There are many yet untested forms of consultation and shared authority that should be tried, including traditional local mechanisms.

### **Dealing with Spoilers**

One of the greatest threats to the long-term success of international peace operations are so called spoilers. They mostly consist of groups and individuals that were involved in wartime human rights violations and are hostile to the peace settlement and the reform agenda such as former militia commanders and members of the security apparatus that have transformed themselves into leaders of ethnically based parties. Often, such actors are also involved in organized crime and their influence may reach deep into the new security apparatus:

*It is critical to understand these power structures before we design any capacity building programs. Each area has its own specific resource that is fuelling these criminal networks. In Afghanistan, for example, the opium economy is at the heart of all problems, in Sierra Leone it is diamonds, in the Democratic Republic of Congo it is coltan and gold, in the Balkans it is smuggling and other organized criminal activities.*

As a thorough assessment of such structures is key and much more effective intelligence gathering capacities for the international presence must be created, ideally during the planning phase of an operation but at the latest as soon as it is deployed. In addition, field missions must develop the ability to conduct intelligence-led operations that tackle the sources of wealth and influence of spoilers:

*Criminal-political networks cannot be tackled through police work alone. In fact, they provide a striking example of the necessity to reform the entire rule of law system simultaneously. The role of public prosecutors has already been touched upon, but the judiciary and the prison service are also critically important. Past experience shows that lack of progress in any one area will nullify the improvements in others and undermine our efforts in the fight against organized crime.*

Apart from efforts to rebuild the local judicial and penal sector, the early deployment of international judges, prosecutors and prison officials should therefore become standard practice, both in executive and non-executive missions. Also, local intelligence reform must be recognized as a key element in security sector reform and must be pursued much more vigorously than in the past.

### **Conditions for Exit**

Dismantling criminal-political networks is a precondition for handing over full responsibility for local law enforcement to local actors. Indeed, it is of fundamental importance for a successful exit of the international community from post-conflict peacebuilding in a “failed state”. The schedule of a mission’s withdrawal must therefore be driven by benchmarks in the attainment of local ownership, not by political and financial fatigue:

*We have to convey a willingness to stay the course until the instituted reforms have had a chance to become firmly established. In practice, this may mean of staying on even after most responsibilities have been handed over to local actors. The first day of local ownership cannot be the last day of the international presence.*

# Official Opening

**Gernot Erler**

*Minister of State, German Federal Foreign Office*

Ladies and Gentleman,

A year full of challenges for international peacekeeping is drawing to an end. Congo, Darfur, the Middle East and lately the Horn of Africa have been on our political agenda, and they will very likely remain on our minds during the coming months, if not years. Peacekeepers continue to do their duty in these and other regions of the world. Under the given—mostly difficult—circumstances, soldiers, police officers and civilian staff are fulfilling an enormous task.

Germany's participation in peacekeeping missions has increased: we have taken the lead of the maritime task force of UNIFIL off the coast of Lebanon and we provided the second largest contingent of EUFOR RD Congo. Our soldiers are returning home from Congo and Gabon these weeks after concluding a difficult, but successful mission.

Against this background, let me welcome you to Berlin and to the 8th International Berlin Workshop organized by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office. We are meeting here this week to evaluate and discuss whether the institutional setup in particular for police missions is giving the missions abroad and their beneficiaries—the local populations—the best possible basis for their work—or do we need improvement in terms of training, political support or legal standards?

I appreciate the presence among us of officers of local police forces in mission areas. It will be our particular interest to follow your input on "lessons learned" and on perspectives for future deployments. I am convinced that your advice will help us to develop and to further

improve the efficiency of police operations in peacekeeping missions. Thank you all very much for making time and sharing your vast experience with us for the next two days.

Modern peacekeeping with its multidimensional approach has rapidly evolved since the beginning of the 1990s. We have moved away from one-dimensional missions whose main tasks focused on securing ceasefire lines and observing the separation of troops. International assistance is now more often needed to re-stabilize failed states or to settle internal conflicts rather than to enforce ceasefires between states. The growing number of crises around the world demands from the international community comprehensive and sustainable solutions that reach far beyond the end of an armed conflict. Rebuilding, or at least stabilizing, statehood is often required.

At the same time, the development of more efficient regional political organizations with improved and more robust political foundations and strengthened operational capabilities can be increasingly instrumental in improving peacekeeping and conflict resolution. They, too, will draw on our resources for police missions as much as on military capabilities, on development input or on political efforts.

International policing in peace operations is part of the evolving modern peacekeeping system. It is a capacity of peacekeeping which is still very young. Germany for the first time sent police officers to Namibia right in the beginning of our UN-peacekeeping engagement in 1989. Shortly after, we participated with Federal Border police officers in the UNTAC-mission in Cambodia in 1992. Until today, Germany has seconded more than 5,000 police officers to international missions lead by the United Nations, the European Union or the OSCE. At present, German officers are on duty in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, Sudan, Liberia and Gaza—just to mention our multilateral commitments.

Since the early police missions, mandates have rapidly developed from observation tasks towards a more sustainable mentoring, training and monitoring role for local police authorities. I have no doubt, that this represents a welcome dynamism. It allows us to create longer-lasting effects in the host countries. Our seminar this week will give us a good opportunity to take stock of what has already been achieved and to ponder over the role of future police missions in the development of post-conflict societies.

It is difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between the work which, in international peacekeeping, is typically assigned to the police on the one hand and the military on the other. The main task of military peacekeepers is normally to establish a safe environment. They are the first ones to be deployed in an area of conflict.

Police missions can build on this by bringing out the seeds for the establishment of a self-sustainable local security system. They prepare the field for the gradual take-over local authorities from the peacekeepers. Although part of their task can be executive police work, they play an increasingly important role in the development of a post-conflict state structure.

The question how they can best fulfill these roles deserves a thorough evaluation -one which you will certainly conduct here during these two days. I would like to offer you just a few thoughts we may wish to put an emphasis on in the preparation of future police missions.

We hear from our staff members in international police missions that the expectations of their local partners as regards obtaining advice and guidance for their work are very high. This applies in general to executive police missions as much as to those mandated for advisory functions and training only. We can conclude that police missions offer a unique opportunity to introduce not only modern police

techniques, but politically more important, to set standards for local police services to operate on the basis of the rule of law.

Many internal conflicts, to be settled through an international peace-keeping effort, have been caused by a blatant disregard for human or minority rights as well as religious freedom. Often enough, local police forces have themselves played a negative role during these conflicts. In such situations in particular, the establishment of the rule of law is an indispensable precondition for renewing the legitimacy and credibility of the local police in the aftermath of an internal conflict.

A priority in our discussions should be the question how much a police mission can achieve without accompanying support in strengthening the judiciary and the penal system. Usually, no one of these sectors can work efficiently without the other. However, deploying the full scope of 'law and order' functions by an international mission would very likely cause capacity problems, at least in terms of seconded personnel. Still, the issue deserves our attention.

Besides responding to local expectations and setting internationally accepted legal parameters, establishing a secure environment for economic activity remains a critical task for international policing. Growth and the generation of income are urgently required for a stable social development next to the introduction of principles of democracy and rule of law. Investors will not take any risk if they are not offered a sufficient degree of security and—again—justice. Police missions will have to focus on this aspect in their executive functions as much as in preparing local capacities to combat financial and economic crimes.

In some crisis regions we may encounter difficulties in our efforts to reach out to local communities, and acceptance for international standards may be limited. This lack of acceptance could be exhibited by both leadership and broader society. The reasons might lie in a



different culture of government, or in the religious traditions which guide the life of a community and in particular their justice system. The legitimacy of an international mission could be at stake. The inclusion of regional institutions in international missions can be an advantage in such cases: in particular, they might find an easier approach to dealing with regional cultural standards, and thus could help to make an international police mission more acceptable to the local community.

On the part of the local security authorities, community-based policing could offer the necessary level of participation in areas, where the population is suspicious of a purely international engagement.

In this context, there have been examples of bilateral support to building up new police organizations in post-conflict situations—one well-known example being Afghanistan. Germany is one of the major bilateral actors in police reform there, and we are conducting similar programs for the Iraqi police and in Lebanon. One of the advantages of the bilateral approach could be an easier adaptation of a reform structure in line with the national system of the donor country. However, the involvement of other donors is almost certain and also necessary in terms of personnel and funding. Questions of coordination, common standards and efficiency may arise. We should, therefore, weigh the advantages of bilateral support efforts against multi-lateral ones, and see how both can be best applied.

An important point of concern for local police reform is the role which individual local officers have played in the past. A reform implemented by policemen and -women perceived to be responsible for the previous conflict, bears a high risk of failure. Relieving officials from, or keeping them in, executive positions represents a verdict that easily reflects their ethnic affiliation. This issue requires a cautious approach—in planning a mission, but also on the ground through

international police experts. I wonder, whether universal guidelines for reviewing the role of the local police in the conflict that preceded the mission should be developed and applied.

In my view, creating and setting standards for international police missions should be a continuing task. It should be led by those international organizations which are actively seconding such missions. There is a need to coordinate and adapt these standards among all these organizations. We need to ensure that the activities of police advisors and the procedures followed by international police in an executive role conform to common standards. The design of standards should be two-fold: First, they should reflect universal standards such as human rights and basic democratic values. Second, on the more technical side, elementary criminological techniques should be made coherent in all missions.

All in all, the population in an area of operation of a police mission should benefit from efficient police work which prevents and, where necessary, thoroughly investigates crime. Additionally, the missions often have to prepare and guarantee a safe environment capable of reassuring displaced victims of conflict that it is possible to return to their homes in dignity. Citizens must experience the fact that the police are working for and not against them. In many conflict zones the perception of the police remains one of a militia system rather than a civilian citizen's police. The public appearance of international and local police officers needs to overcome this perception.

I would like to close here and leave you with these thoughts for discussion. You will have noticed that I personally, but also the German Federal government in general, attach great importance to successful police missions in international peacekeeping. We consider them not only an obligation but also—and much more so—an opportunity.

## **Panel I**

# **The Start-Up Phase. How to Improve Military, Police and Civilian Cooperation**

**Peter Wittig**

*Director-General for the United Nations and Global Issues,  
German Federal Foreign Office*

I would like to begin this panel with a few ideas on three parameters of our panel-discussion:

Firstly, the nature of the conflict determines the kind of peace operation that is needed. We will probably have to focus in our discussion on peace operations after intra-state conflicts rather than inter-state conflicts. As we know, intra-state conflicts have become the prevailing type of conflict that we have been facing over the recent years.

Secondly, we will be dealing with two sub-sections of the security sector: The military which typically provides external security, and the institutions that typically provide "internal law and order": the police, the judiciary and the penal system—what has been called the "law and order triad". In conflict-ridden societies as in post-conflict peace operations these two types of security functions are typically blurred, a fact which in itself contributes to problems of post conflict operations. One of our assignments here is to clarify the relationship between police and military in peace operations on the one hand and the relationship between police and the civilian elements of the "rule of law triad" on the other hand.

My third parameter concerns the timeline of the post-conflict continuum. When is the best time for deployment of military and police in post-conflict situations? Army first, police later or both at the

beginning with the police gradually increasing their presence? When can the military disengage or which functions cannot be covered by executive police missions? Where are the red lines? I am looking forward to a lively discussion on these and other issues.

**Major General Eduardo Aldunate**

***former Deputy Force Commander, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)***

Let me begin my presentation by giving a short overview of the current United Nations intervention in Haiti. After the outbreak of armed conflict in Haiti in February 2004, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1529 authorized the Multinational Interim Force (MIF). On 1 June 2004, authority was transferred from MIF to MINUSTAH. The mandate of MINUSTAH included the tasks of establishing a secure environment, assisting national dialogue and reconciliation, guaranteeing the organization of free and fair elections, and supporting the extension of state authority as well as the promotion and protection of human rights.

The considerable security threats facing MINUSTAH stem from criminal gangs rather than heavily armed militias. This is particularly true for Cité Soleil, a desperately poor neighborhood of the capital Port au Prince of about 300,000 people. Other parts of the country have been mostly calm and I want to contradict the notion that all of Haiti resembles the slums of Cité Soleil. Still, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Grinding poverty, violence, corruption, and HIV/AIDS affect the lives of a considerable part of the population. As Deputy Force Commander, one is sometimes compelled to use force to fight gangs and other agents of violence. However, the situation in Haiti is much too complex to be solved with bullets alone.

I have in fact come to the conclusion that peacebuilding in post-conflict situations is a more complex task than fighting a war. In order to fulfill our mandate, therefore, we first of all need exceptionally well-qualified and well-trained personnel. Military contingents serving in MINUSTAH must be able to "win the hearts and minds" of the local population, and at the same time they need to be ready to act as com-

batants in compliance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and with the Rules of Engagement (RoEs). This illustrates the complexity of the task. The key to success lies to a large degree in the quality of the junior officer and non-commissioned ranks as they command the small units that come into direct contact with the population and determine its perception of the international mission. Consequently, efforts to train and prepare international military personnel urgently need to be stepped up.

Local capacity is, however, just as important, particularly for achieving sustainability. Self evidently, a withdrawal of the international military presence can only be considered after a functioning police force has been established. When I arrived in Haiti, the Haitian National Police consisted of less than 5,000 officers for a population of 8.3 million people—compare this to the 30,000 officers for roughly the same number of people in New York City. Due to lack of personnel alone, the police was unable to provide security in most parts of the country. In addition, as the Director of Police estimated, 30% of the officers were involved in corruption and, quite understandably, the police was deeply mistrusted by the population. The total breakdown of the judicial and penal systems exacerbated the situation. Prisons were overcrowded and 90% of inmates had never seen a courtroom. It should be clear that in this environment, rebuilding an efficient police force linked to a functioning judicial and penal system will require a very long-term effort on the part of the international community.

The issues of cooperation, coordination and the chain of command in peace operations are frequently debated. While cooperation among the different elements in a mission is widely recognized as vital, one additional lesson I learned is how beneficial cooperation with other actors such as NGOs and other civil society organizations can be—particularly in the area of human rights. The mission cannot operate successfully if it is not perceived as legitimate by the local

population. Cooperating closely with various human rights actors, including in the investigation of complaints, helped us maintain this legitimacy.

However, there are cases where voluntary cooperation with other actors is not sufficient. In my opinion, having two different chains of command for the international military and the police components sometimes adds to the complexity of the post-conflict situation. Cooperation and coordination might work well with regard to mission administration, program planning and other similar issues. However, one single chain of command is needed once it comes to security operations on the ground.

The final lesson I would like to mention is the importance of intelligence. In MINUSTAH, we did not have a sufficient intelligence-gathering capacity for a long time. Only after 16 months was a Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) created. It was responsible for providing strategic information and advising the senior mission leadership. With JMAC we finally created a dedicated unit where civilian UN staff, the international military and police elements and the Haiti National Police were working together. This capacity is absolutely crucial for such a mission.

To conclude, today Haiti does have an elected government as a result of an election that may well have been the most open and democratic the country has ever held. Practically all areas are under the security control of the government and the international presence. However, this does not suffice. I am convinced that the international community needs to pursue a broader and more persistent agenda, otherwise the UN will soon be called upon for yet another emergency intervention in Haiti. What is unfortunately still missing is a discussion about the underlying problems of Haitian society that make this country such an enormous challenge for peacebuilding efforts. There needs

to be an open debate about what state structure and which institutions are appropriate to solve the fundamental issue of equal participation of all citizens in the political process and resources of the country. The involvement of the people of Haiti in this process is absolutely central and the international community should encourage and assist all local actors to contribute their ideas for the creation of a fair society capable of solving social conflicts in a peaceful manner and of applying the rule of law equally to all the citizens.



**Peter Miller**

***Director West Africa Police Program, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and former Police Commissioner UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)***

My observations are based on my experience as police commissioner in the UN missions in East Timor and Western Sahara and in various other functions in Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Guatemala over the past ten years.

The first issue I would like to raise is the central importance of the relationship between the police commissioner and force commander which in my opinion is generally not given sufficient attention. If the force commander and the police commissioner do not act in concert, it will have a negative impact on the cooperation and overall performance of international soldiers and police. As a consequence, more efforts are required to make sure this relationship is productive right from the start. One example could be team-building measures during the pre-deployment phase once force commander and police commissioner have been appointed. While this has been given some thought within the UN, it has to my knowledge not been implemented yet.

I would also like to reiterate a point that has already been mentioned: the quality of personnel is decisive. My experience in this respect has been that I have not always received either the type or the quality of personnel I needed. In many cases I have, in fact, envied the military since contributing states normally deploy whole units that are used to working together. By contrast, officers deployed to international police missions have not typically worked together previously; they come from different cultural backgrounds and are accustomed to very different policing styles. Not all contributing countries practice community-based policing, some officers are used to a more aggressive approach, and this is not a suitable example for police forces in post-

conflict societies. This problem is heightened if the officers are not sufficiently trained and qualified.

At the beginning of 2006, about 8,000 police officers were deployed in UN-led peace operations and the UN estimates that about 15,000 might be needed within the next two years. However, we do not only need the right quantity but also the right quality of personnel. The terms Q1 and Q2 have recently been used to signify these two factors. Some of the major contributors in the UN system are deploying police officers that are not prepared to undertake the duties assigned to them, have not received any pre-deployment training, do not know much about the conflict and geographical area they are deployed to, and might in some cases not even be of sufficient health. These individuals not only constitute a problem in terms of performance but can also become a liability for security reasons. Efforts are underway in the UN and member states to improve training opportunities for police personnel and a number of capacity-building projects for those African states contributing police have recently emerged. While these mark steps in the right direction, I would like to stress that so long as the deficiencies outlined above are not addressed and pre-deployment training is not made mandatory, we will continue to suffer the consequences in missions.

The final lesson I would like to share concerns time frames. There is often a high degree of pressure on our programs to re-build and train police forces so that the local force is operational as soon as possible. Sometimes officers receive only six or eight weeks of training before we put them out on the street, give them a gun and expect them to respond properly to all kinds of emergencies. In addition, as soon as the number of local officers has reached a quantity deemed acceptable by the political leadership, the number of experienced international officers in the mission starts to be reduced. In my opinion, we are asking for major problems if this reduction/downsizing takes place

too quickly. What is required is a minimum training period of six months for local officers and a continued presence of a sufficient number of international officers to monitor and, if necessary, support them for a considerable period after that. This downsizing plan may have to be slowed down if problems are being encountered. I am of course aware that the necessarily higher costs will not be popular at UN Headquarters or in the capitals of contributing countries. There is, however, no alternative to this approach if police reform is to be made sustainable.

**Colonel Thomas Pope**

***US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)***

Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in this conference. I would like to highlight some observations gleaned from my recent experience in Afghanistan which I hope will generate a lively discussion and potential solutions to some very challenging issues. Three key concepts have emerged from this experience: the need for an integrated approach; the need to balance requirements; and the need to deploy the appropriate resources in a timely manner.

Five years after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, we are faced with the conditions created by focusing primarily on short-term military objectives in response to 9-11 and the absence of equal efforts applied to nation-building. How then did we get to this point, and what lessons can we learn for the future?

One observation is that there is a need to balance short-term objectives with long-term requirements. The initial stages of the military intervention might have been more effective if they had been followed by the execution of a near-simultaneous comprehensive plan which attacked the root causes of internal instability and filled the power vacuum generated by the ousting of the Taliban. While the military focused on direct action against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, they were neither trained nor organized to deal with the vast array of public order and governance reform tasks required to stabilize the country and facilitate sustained reform.

As part of the Bonn Agreement, individual nations were assigned lead-nation status for certain functional areas of reform without the benefit of an overarching structure, and were accountable for synchronizing the reform effort along with continuing to fight the insurgency. What was lacking was a coordinated, multilateral framework for security sector reform (SSR) and improved governance.

As a result, the four-legged stool of security sector reform—justice, penal, military and police—wobbled from the uneven levels of commitment and development in each sector. The failure to synchronize development has led at the very least to non-mutually supportive, and often even to counterproductive, efforts.

This unsynchronized effort has generated seams and gaps which anti-government elements have exploited in order to resist the reform effort. In fact, internal security conditions may have actually spawned the emergence of Afghanistan as the world's largest opium producer and may have set the conditions for a future narco-state.

In the first three years following the fall of the Taliban there were no significant police reforms or improvements to public order visible to those Afghans outside Kabul. However, the Afghan National Army (ANA) demonstrated some improvement and has slowly built its capacity to conduct independent operations. Unlike the Afghan National Police (ANP), the ANA reform started early with the resourcing of equipment, training and embedded mentors from the strategic to the tactical level. The failure to do the same with the ANA has created numerous challenges which the international community is now attempting to address.

While the ANA is a particularly bright spot in security sector reform, there were some other developments which showed promise in the evolution of Afghan democracy. Successful democratic elections and economic reconstruction efforts were positive steps. However, the wobbly stool of security sector reform hampered progress. Neither the police nor the judicial and penal reforms were meeting the needs of the country. While both areas were improving, their rate of development was slow and cautious.

The standing Afghan police force was adrift without an effective rule of law system and a mature central government. The ANP, serving as

the front line of defense against corruption and illicit power structures, lacked international mentorship that could support it in bridging the gap between military action and community police duty. Too often, police work fell to elements with self-serving interests or to well-intentioned but ineffective officers. As a result, public security gaps in the countryside had to be filled by Coalition forces, ANA units and local militias.

The deployment of international personnel was not adequate to meet the needs of a fragile Afghanistan. Special Purpose or Formed Police Units (FPUs), which had performed effectively in the Balkans and elsewhere, were never deployed in Afghanistan. Police advisors and trainers were deployed late and in numbers inadequate for the task of making a positive impact on the initial stages of the conflict. By 2004, more than two years after the military intervention, only about 70 police trainers and advisors were in place across the country. Today, there are more than 300 in 24 of the 34 provinces, with a goal of deploying significantly more within the next year.

To fill the void left in the countryside, Germany and the United States created a training program in an attempt to meet short-term training requirements and set the conditions for the long-term development of senior leaders. The first officers graduated from the training program in May 2003. By the presidential elections in October 2004, 26,000 of 62,000 ANP officers had received the basic training required for patrolmen. These recently trained policemen went to their first duty station only to find themselves under-equipped and hamstrung by ineffective penal and judicial systems. Moreover, in contrast to other international police reform missions, these officers were not adequately supported through field mentorship by the international community.

Lessons from Afghanistan suggest the need for:

- a holistic, integrated, and well-resourced approach to intervention which includes connecting military objectives to an overall approach to security sector reform. Effective SSR is directly linked to the prospects for successful nation-building.
- a requirement for the deployment of international transitional law enforcement capabilities to fill the public-order vacuum.
- the early deployment of international police and rule of law experts, in order to jumpstart the simultaneous processes of police and justice reform. These experts should synchronize their programs with, but not subordinate them to, military reform efforts.

**Colonel Fausto Rossi**

***Chief, Studies and Research Department,  
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)***

I would like first of all to address the question whether the military should play a stronger role in establishing public order and rule of law in peace operations. The answer depends on the specific circumstances. If we are dealing with *peace enforcement*, the answer is probably yes, if we are dealing with *peacekeeping*, the answer is probably no. The question how to address the security and the deployment gaps then needs to be answered. One possibility for closing the former would be to deploy more robust police units that are capable of providing not only general public order functions, but anti-riot functions as well. However, if we want to close the deployment gap at the same time, Formed Police Units (FPUs) must in addition be quickly deployable, interoperable, have a self-defense capability, and must be provided with logistics. The importance of self-defense capabilities and logistics should not be underestimated. The greater the police's reliance upon the military for force protection and for logistics, the more police operations will be conditioned by military plans; any operational independence will subsequently be lost.

Experience shows that Gendarmerie-type police forces with a strong military element are best suited to deployment during the start-up phase of an intervention. Such constabulary forces exist in several European countries (the Gendarmerie in France, the Carabinieri in Italy, the Guardia Civil in Spain, the Koninklijke Marechaussee in the Netherlands, the Guarda Nacional in Portugal) but also in non-European states such as Chile and Morocco. These units have the capability to be deployed under a military as well as under a civilian chain of command, and have proven their suitability on numerous occasions in the Balkans.



In terms of command and control, all international actors should follow the example of NATO and adopt the so called "Blue Box/Green Box" model originated by the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in 1997. This model is a way to define areas of responsibility for the police and the military. Within the *Blue Box*, the police have primary responsibility but military forces can be deployed in support under the tactical control of the police commissioner. The *Green Box*, which is typically larger, is controlled by the military but police forces can be called in to support certain operations by the military force commander.

A newly developed doctrine of the United Nations differentiates between public disorder situations of a non-military nature, that is, with no sustained use of fire-arms, versus those of a military nature. The missions' FPU have primacy in addressing non-military scenarios, in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. However, the head of the police component has the option of requesting military units in order to perform specific tasks. In dealing with public disorder situations of a military nature involving the sustained use of firearms, the doctrine calls for the international military force taking the lead role, with the force commander or sector unit commander requesting FPU personnel to support the operation as needed. This new doctrine could be called the "light version" of the Blue Box/Green Box concept.

Many challenges arise in the deployment of police in peace operations. There is, for example, a need for pre-deployment training and joint exercises in addition to Joint Operation Cells, and communication and logistics have to be improved. But while these are all issues that need to be addressed, I want to emphasize again that in my opinion the question of command and control is currently the most pressing problem.

## **Discussion**

### **Cooperation, Coordination and Integration— Catchwords or Concepts?**

In the current debate about peace operations, the terms "cooperation", "integration" or "holistic approach" are frequently used. This seems to signal a general understanding that cooperation among the various actors needs to be enhanced in order to facilitate a joint effort, to use scarce resources efficiently, as well as to enhance chances for overall success of a mission. Recent discussions in various organizations' headquarters seem to reflect this. The UN is exploring the concept of Integrated Missions and developing an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP); the EU and UN have signed a Joint Declaration on cooperation, and NATO's Comprehensive Political Guidance also addresses coordination issues.

Nevertheless, participants felt that a clear understanding of future divisions of labor is as of yet missing and argued that this was particularly true for the area of military-police cooperation. Here, roles are inevitably blurred at the outset of an operation. However, the lack of a clear delineation of roles can easily spark competitive relationships in which the military will invariably dominate. An intensified and thorough dialogue among those involved on differences in mandates, approaches and focus as well as future divisions of responsibilities was therefore seen as a precondition for any intensified cooperation. In this context, participants stressed that the issue of cooperation should not be left to the field by means of a "bottom-up" approach. Measures to enhance a joint effort on the ground must instead be based on common understandings and agreements at headquarters level.

## Enhancing Cooperation in the Start-Up Phase

Early and effective military-police cooperation was seen as paramount in order to create security at the outset of an operation. However, experience has shown that there are a number of practical obstacles to cooperation in the field. These include differences with regard to personnel capacity, deployment timelines, equipment as well as differences in organizational culture, mandate and working style. The first part of the discussion focused on the question how these obstacles could be overcome.

Participants agreed that in order to achieve an effective division of labor, police deployment will have to be considerably faster than it has been so far. If a joint deployment of military and police is not possible, a deployment within the same overall timeframe should be the aim. A number of international organizations have started to address this problem. One participant outlined that the EU is currently focusing on bringing the police deployment timeline of 30 days closer to that of the military which—through the Battle Group concept—can deploy within 10 days. It was generally recognized, however, that the quick deployment of qualified personnel is primarily a member state responsibility. The scope of action of the UN, EU and other international organizations will remain limited for as long as member states fail to structure their systems in a way that facilitates the rapid recruitment and deployment of qualified and pre-trained personnel.

Further suggestions for improving police-military cooperation at the outset of a mission included procedures for joint planning and joint operation orders such as Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Operations Plan (OPLAN) and Rules of Engagement (RoEs). In addition, the idea of establishing joint command posts, joint headquarters or similar joint structures such as the joint crisis management centre in Kosovo was raised. While there was general agreement that this could en-

hance cooperation, some cautioned that joint structures alone do not automatically bring military and police actors together. This was the experience made by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) where difficulties in the Joint Operations Centre arose from differences in organizational and working cultures. Efforts to enhance cooperation must therefore move beyond joint or cooperative structures to include, for example, joint training or team-building measures.

### **From Cooperation to Joint Operations?**

The question of joint operations between military and police was discussed, giving rise to contrasting positions. Here, too, participants noted the practical problems arising from different techniques and doctrinal approaches. However, the issue of joint command and control structures was seen as the primary challenge here. Participants noted that, so far, experiences with joint command structures have been mixed. In the early days of police deployment in peace operations, the police were deployed under the military force commander—a concept that did not meet widespread approval among the police at the time. Experience in Kosovo has furthermore shown, so one participant argued, that unified chains of command lead *de facto* to military dominance since the military was generally unwilling to take orders from civilian actors.

In order to bring some clarity to this debate about joint operations and joint command structures, participants thought it useful to differentiate between the strategic and the operational level. At the strategic level, the unity of command needs to come from the political authority at the top. It is the civilian leadership of a mission that should determine how police and military capabilities are to be used to tackle a certain problem that is fundamentally political in character.

On the operational level those joint operations which require a joint and unified command can be split into two categories. The first one is a pre-planned operation—for example a police operation with military back up. Here command questions are clarified in advance and do generally not constitute a problem. The challenge lies in the second category, namely an unexpected crisis with military and police on the ground in the same area to resolve it. The large-scale civil unrest in Kosovo in March 2004 provides an example of such a situation. Here the question of who should be in command becomes a key issue. Concepts such as the Blue Box/Green Box concept outlined earlier on aim at general guidelines regulating whether it is the police or the military that should assume command in a given situation. However, participants felt that in practice these issues have not been fully solved yet and continue to constitute problems in day-to-day cooperation.

Participants stressed that situations such as the one in Kosovo in March 2004 cannot be addressed successfully without unity of command. Particularly in volatile situations, clarity on who assumes responsibility, gives and enforces orders is paramount. In the words of one participant: "Unity of command should mean that the work of various actors is integrated but that in the end one person determines what needs to be done and who is doing what."

### **Addressing the Deployment and Enforcement Gaps**

Recent missions have frequently suffered from what has been termed the "deployment gap". The military, because it is its essence to be capable to respond rapidly to national security threats, arrives on the scene early on and then waits for six months or more until the international community has mobilized its police capacity. This situation in turn leads to what has been called the "enforcement gap". The military here basically only has two options to respond for example to rioting or criminal activity. They can respond with lethal force or they

can do nothing—neither of which are desirable outcomes. The second part of the discussion focused on how these gaps—which are not merely a question of increased military-police cooperation but (and more so) a question of capacity—could be filled.

One participant argued that—although some improvements have been made in recent years—the deployment gap will remain a problem since it is rooted in a deep structural issue: sufficient numbers of police personnel are simply not available and while there is a shortage of military for peace operations, the shortage of police is even more severe. This would then raise the question whether the military should prepare itself—through training, equipment, RoEs and leadership—to be more involved in policing tasks. Stronger military engagement in policing at the outset of operations might also allow for a more proactive approach in detaining those who have committed serious human rights violations or are engaged in organized crime—something that has been a deficit in previous missions.

Some participants argued that "there is no need to make a policeman out of a soldier or vice versa". They stressed that policemen are still best-suited to perform policing tasks, and that blurring military and police functions might send the wrong message to the host country where the aim is to establish democratic policing standards. Others noted that deployment and enforcement gaps need to be filled by *some* capability whether it be military or civilian. There was a general agreement among police and military participants, however, that the military taking on police tasks out of necessity and on an *ad hoc* basis, without the necessary preparation, is one of the least desirable options.

The discussion addressed some of the requirements that will need to be met in order to close deployment and enforcement gaps. First of all, the ability to provide public security in a volatile environment is para-

mount. Among others, the situation in Iraq has shown that failure to do so can risk relapse into lawlessness, revenge killings, etc. As individual police are not generally in a position to deal with Mafia-type structures, criminal gangs or large scale riots, a robust capacity is needed. Finally, such capacity will have to be able not only to do crowd control but also to deal with parallel security structures which are a common phenomenon in post-conflict countries. On this note, one participant stressed that illicit power structures are the primary grounds for bringing military and police capabilities together.

Given these requirements, an expansion of the use of Formed Police Units (FPUs) was seen as one of the most promising approaches for the future. They are capable of quick deployment but also robust enough to survive in the initial stages of an operation where the security situation might be most volatile. Due to their hybrid character, they are particularly well suited to work alongside the military and can also serve a bridging function to facilitate the transition between military and police once the security situation has sufficiently stabilized. Finally they are flexible in their composition: In addition to the mobile elements in charge of riot control, there are specialized elements which are built case-by-case according to mandate and needs (in Bosnia for example there was a sizeable investigation element).

One participant questioned whether FPUs—despite their flexibility—can sufficiently cater for the specialized functions needed within the police component of a peace operation. Others stressed that while increased use of FPUs would certainly be desirable, the most apparent problem here, too, is the lack of capacity. One participant noted that half of the international police deployed today was currently within FPUs and that it is questionable whether this ratio can be considerably increased in the short term. The current situation with regard to Darfur makes this very clear. While the UN has outlined that they need

16 FPUs at a minimum they should ideally have 40 for the kind of task at hand, however, there is no capacity to provide them. "We cannot rely on the FPUs alone" was the cautious conclusion. While they are well suited for the challenges arising particularly during the start-up phase, capacity remains a largely unresolved issue.



## **Panel II**

# **Establishing New Police Structures in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia**

**Stephen Curtis**

*Police Commissioner, United Nations Interim Administration Mission  
in Kosovo (UNMIK)*

I would like to focus my remarks on one overarching theme: the management of the relationship between the international police force and other actors. These actors are: firstly our local counterparts; secondly the international military presence; and thirdly neighboring and other directly affected states. In this context I will also raise some specific issues that are of particular relevance to the situation in Kosovo but that certainly need to be addressed in other post-conflict areas also, such as skill profiles of international police officers, length of rotation of seconded staff, pay levels of local officers, and witness protection programs.

The central message I wish to convey is that police reform cannot be dealt with in isolation. This statement may seem self-evident to this audience, but a large number of senior staff, particularly senior police officers, still seem to believe that the police can solve all their own problems. I realized soon after my arrival in Kosovo six months ago, that the cooperation between the Kosovo Department of Justice (DoJ), the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the international police mission was not working as well as it should and that improving it would be a central task of my assignment. As lack of communication turned out to be one source of the problem, my decision to ban emails from my investigators to prosecutors, and insist on more regular face-to-face meetings proved to be a step in the right direction. The

response from senior staff at the DoJ was very positive and relationships improved across the board, mainly through greater dialogue.

One issue that arose frequently between UNMIK police and the DoJ was resolution of tensions caused by the different standards and procedures followed by local prosecutors and judges on the one hand and their international colleagues on the other. In addition, international prosecutors and judges with a continental, Roman Law background seemed not infrequently to disagree with their colleagues with a Common Law education. Achieving a unified approach among and between these groupings requires constant attention and support at the strategic level.

I found that, as a rule, local prosecutors and judges are more risk-averse than their international colleagues, particularly in cases involving the connection of organized crime with corrupt officials and politicians whose influence sometimes reaches into the law enforcement agencies. As in most other post-conflict societies, these illicit power structures form a key challenge to the international peace-building effort in Kosovo in general and police reform in particular. The only solution in such cases is to provide aggressive back-up for local actors by the international police and, if necessary, the military as well. It is necessary to instill confidence within a Kosovan judge or prosecutor in order that he or she can successfully begin to confront these illegal networks; and understandably without that confidence, few will want to undertake such a difficult and dangerous task, although some nevertheless do.

At this point, I would like to mention briefly three specific problems confronting the fight against organized crime in Kosovo. The first concerns police corruption. It is clearly vital to implement strict anti-corruption standards, but I believe that greater attention also needs to be paid to the conditions of service of local police officers. The

average monthly pay for a KPS officer of Euros 240 is insufficient, given the high cost of living in Kosovo, and leads to a substantial risk of corruption.

The second issue is the necessity of setting up a well-organized and well-funded witness protection program. As every police officer is aware, witnesses are central to dismantling criminal networks and witnesses must know and believe that they will be protected after they have given evidence, otherwise they will not cooperate with the authorities in the first place. Yet witness protection is practically impossible within Kosovo. The small size of the country and the tight social fabric make it impossible to hide anyone. The solution is to relocate endangered persons outside the area but, as Kosovo is not an independent state, it is not currently party to any international agreements covering such actions. There remain serious legal obstacles to overcome in this respect.

The third issue impacting on the struggle against organized crime—although its repercussions are not limited to this field alone—is the highly decentralized structure of the KPS. There are five regional commanders who have up to 1,500 officers under their command and are in some ways virtually autonomous from headquarters command. The existence of these "semi-independent police forces" is a serious obstacle to implementing a coordinated anti-organized-crime policy. They tend to resist any initiative coming from the center and they have only very limited strategic planning capacities of their own. Reining this dysfunctional process back in has proven to be a very time-consuming task. We have recently completed an assessment of the performance of the regional commanders and, partly as a result of this, one of them has been removed.

Even if these technical problems can be overcome, there remains a more profound challenge for us all. Criminal-political networks cannot

be tackled through police work alone. In fact, they provide a striking example of the necessity to reform the entire rule of law system simultaneously. The role of public prosecutors has already been touched upon, but the judiciary and the prison service are also critically important. Past experience shows that lack of progress in any one area will nullify the improvements in others and undermine our efforts in the fight against organized crime.

Turning now to the relationship between the international police and military presence, I must admit that I found defining the proper role of the police and maintaining a good working relationship with the 17,000 KFOR troops still stationed in Kosovo more difficult than I had imagined. There are, of course, a number of guidelines and standard operating procedures that determine our respective areas of responsibility, but they cannot cover all eventualities. Issues arising from those gaps must be solved daily on a case-by-case basis by UNMIK police and KFOR staff. A constant dialogue between the two has to take place at all levels and there are many examples showing that a breakdown at any one level may quickly lead to an overall temporary breakdown of cooperation. This is not to belittle the vast amount of good cooperative work which is achieved on a daily basis and, precisely because of its success, goes largely unrecognized.

In order for the police to be a competent and respected partner to the military it is imperative that they have the necessary resources at their disposal, particularly with regards to personnel. Beyond the question of the quantity and general quality of the police presence—the Q1 and Q2 dimensions mentioned before in this Workshop—it is important to bear in mind the dimension of the individual officers' skill profile. It is not that UNMIK police has too few officers, nor that they are not professionally qualified. What is lacking is a sufficient number of officers with certain specific qualifications including, most importantly at the moment, strategic planners and experienced

criminal investigators. I hope that the UN will soon address this issue, but any progress depends, of course, on the cooperation of national governments in seconding the experts in question to the UN. This same cooperation is also needed in lengthening the tours of duty of some international police officers and indeed military personnel. This measure would, apart from numerous other benefits, greatly improve our mutual cooperation. Working relationships are based on personal acquaintance and experience and rapid staff turn-over means that these relationships have to be constantly re-established.

Let me close with a few remarks about the impact of neighboring states and other nations affected by developments in Kosovo on the work of UNMIK police. Overall, they have played a very constructive role. Several neighboring states have provided considerable assistance in combating cross-border organized crime through signing memoranda of understanding and sharing information and intelligence. In a number of high-profile cases we were also able to move key witnesses abroad on the basis of *ad hoc* arrangements. Clearly, there is room for improvement but I am hopeful that this form of cooperation will be developed much further in the future.

A final positive example is that of Germany, which has recognized the negative effects of organized crime in Kosovo on its own national security and taken the step of providing many of the international staff of the Department of Organized Crime in UNMIK-P. These experts are particularly welcome as they can offer urgently needed expertise in highly technical and confidential investigative fields. I would appeal to other governments to follow that example as I am convinced that such efforts represent a sound investment for the safety and security of their own countries.

**Steve Bennett**

***Director, Department of Police Education and Development,  
OSCE Mission to Kosovo (OMIK)***

My experience from Kosovo where I have been serving for seven years, as well as from other post-conflict areas where I was involved in fact-finding and assessment missions, has taught me valuable lessons for the establishing and sustaining of new police structures, in particular in the fields of training and vetting.

Let me start by presenting some facts and figures on the current make-up of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). It will reach its projected end strength of 7,350 officers by summer 2007. The background of these officers can be described as follows: 20% are former Yugoslav police officers, 36% have a military background, mostly as former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). This high percentage is the direct result of the demobilization strategy followed by the international community at the start of the intervention that mandated the integration of a large number of KLA fighters into the new police service. In fact, it was established that for the first 18 months of its existence, the KPS applicant pool had to consist of 50% ex-KLA members. This demobilization strategy did not prove as problematic as I and many others originally feared. It should not, however, be inferred that such a strategy will work equally well in other situations.

15% of serving officers are women, 16% belong to the Serbian or another ethnic minority. I believe that meeting the target quotas set by the international community for the recruitment of women and members of ethnic minorities—which were 15% of the total force in both cases—is one of the great success stories of the Kosovo mission. This was achieved by an aggressive program of affirmative action at all levels. It should be noted that, although affirmative action helped

achieve these numbers, standards of recruitment were never compromised or lowered.

In efforts to build sustainable police structures, it is impossible to attach too much importance to the vetting of officers. Although vetting continues throughout the training process and beyond, the initial vetting prior to recruitment is particularly important. According to what I call the "chicken salad theory", you cannot create a quality product from poor ingredients. In other words, a successful police service can only be built on the foundation of suitable officer recruits. The experience from Afghanistan and Iraq indicates what will happen if the front-end vetting is not done properly. The KPS selection criteria are therefore broadly equivalent to Western standards: a minimum age of 21 years, secondary education, no criminal history, and physical as well as mental fitness. These criteria are applied universally to all new recruits, including women and members of minority groups. The 80% failure rate at the entry level shows that we take our standards very seriously.

One of the reasons for success in creating a widely respected, professional police force in Kosovo was the fact that all recruits without exception receive the same basic training at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS). The fact that recruits sit in the same classrooms, that they eat together and share dormitories has a strong integrative function, facilitating bonding across gender and ethnic lines. The current entry-level training regime calls for 20 weeks at the KPSS followed by 20 weeks of field training in a one-on-one situation with a qualified Field Training Officer. This field-training period is pivotal to the training process: no matter how long trainees spend at the police academy, they cannot possibly learn all the practical aspects of policing in a classroom. There are also additional three levels of management courses for senior staff.

Training and vetting for internationals is the other side of the coin and is an issue that in my experience clearly merits greater attention. The pre-training given to international police officers sent to Kosovo, for example, was deficient in many cases. Vetting for international capacity-building staff is particularly crucial, since these individuals have a role-model function. In addition, the right balance between generalist and specialist officers must be found. In the field, we need officers who are able to perform a wide variety of functions: monitoring, certifying, advising, planning, training, patrolling, investigating, and performing arrests. These officers must be held to the very highest standards, following a simple rule: if you misbehave you pack your bags. The same zero-tolerance policy has also been introduced for local officers, and we certainly cannot apply lower standards to ourselves than to those we are training.

A further important aspect is the length of stay of international police officers. I believe it is important that international capacity-building staff reside in the mission area for a substantial period of time, despite the risks of their "going native" and suffering a loss of objectivity. Only longer rotations than are presently the norm can create institutional continuity as well as a deeper understanding for the situation in the country that makes effective police work possible. I realize that longer tours of duty for international officers are a sensitive issue, given national career patterns and the scarcity of highly qualified staff willing to serve in international peace operations. Nevertheless, the seconding nations must be brought to understand that extended tours in the mission area are a precondition for building sustainable police structures in Kosovo and other post-conflict countries.



## **Atifete Jahjaga**

### ***Assistant Deputy Police Commissioner, Kosovo Border Police (KBP)***

Several important lessons and dilemmas can be found in the history of the establishment of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the KBP, which started seven years ago from zero. They relate to what I would call the closing of gaps in our efforts to develop local capacities able to uphold the rule of law and guarantee a democratic future for Kosovo. I will concentrate on three particular gaps, all connected to what I see as our central challenge—the fight against organized crime. These are firstly, gaps between KPS/KBP and local non-state actors; secondly, between the local police forces and other state institutions; and thirdly between the local police and Kosovo's neighbors.

Before addressing these issues, however, let me point out a central dilemma that has already been mentioned by other speakers. There was a marked tension during the early post-conflict period between quality and quantity in the KPS and KBP, illustrating the general tension between short-term and long-term goals common to many international peacebuilding efforts. The short-term need for a number of police officers on the ground conflicted with long-term considerations for high quality policing. The first called for a rapid training program, the second for a much longer learning period, including time spent working under a training officer in the field. Broadly speaking, one must admit that in this early period, quantity often won out over quality.

This situation was not helped by the neglect of what Commissioner Curtis has called the "skills profile" of international officers by the international organizations and individual states participating in the intervention. In my opinion, many international police officers either lacked or were poorly qualified in certain skill areas. This naturally had a negative effect on the scope of skills represented in

the KPS/KBP. The recruitment process of the internationals sent to Kosovo should have been better matched to the actual requirements on the ground. As has already been mentioned, a further problem was the rapid rotation of international officers, leading to a lack of continuity in their efforts.

Subsequent recruitment efforts by the KPS/KBP using higher standards have to a large extent been able to correct the earlier emphasis on quantity by ensuring that a sufficient number of recruits with relevant skills have entered the service. The training program laid out in the previous presentation by Steve Bennett has also played a crucial role. This work must be continued and be supplemented by training curricula that cover a range of specialized skills the KPS/KBP is currently lacking, in particular in the field of combating organized crime. This brings me to the three gaps I mentioned above that need to be closed in order to dismantle criminal networks.

Firstly, local non-governmental actors need to be more closely involved in this effort. Possible measures include educating the public about the danger posed by organized crime for the future development of Kosovo, fostering public confidence in the willingness and ability of the security forces to tackle organized crime and, in particular, providing a safe environment where individual citizens feel they can step forward and support us by refusing to cooperate with criminals or providing evidence against them.

Secondly, to close the gaps between the KPS/KBP and other government agencies in Kosovo, there is an urgent need for a unified government strategy on fighting organized crime. This strategy must be both horizontal—incorporating institutions throughout all policy areas—as well as vertical—incorporating institutions at the local to the central government level. It must in particular aim at increasing the various institutions' internal capacities for combating criminal

structures. Here the assistance of the international community will be crucial for success. Accordingly, the strategy must be developed in close cooperation with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and other relevant international actors.

In this context, I would like to highlight one particular aspect in which I am involved in my daily work. Intelligence-driven risk analysis is central to an effective strategy for combating organized crime. We must therefore improve the ability of various government agencies to collect and store information and in particular to exchange it among each other. This effort has both an organizational and a technical dimension. On the organizational side, the necessary procedures for information-sharing have to be developed and implemented even if this means changing institutional cultures. To this end, we should increase the number of direct, personal contacts between the personnel of the agencies involved. These contacts are currently very limited. On the technical side, the data storage systems of the individual institutions must be upgraded and made compatible. In addition, more staff need to be trained in their use. In these activities the support of the international community through the provision of equipment and capacity building measures would be extremely valuable.

The third and final issue I want to raise concerns the gap between the local police and Kosovo's neighbors. It is indisputable that organized crime does not stop at national borders. As it is transnational in nature, the KPS/KBP efforts to eradicate it must necessarily involve an improved cooperation with our counterparts in neighboring countries. As Commissioner Curtis mentioned, some successes have already been achieved but much remains to be done. As in the case of local Kosovar institutions, we need closer institutional ties with neighboring police and border control forces, including regular personal contacts and the sharing of sensitive information. Furthermore, I would argue that the

governments of Kosovo, other Balkan states and the international community should jointly develop a regional strategy against organized crime. I believe all actors are aware of the dangers posed by organized criminal activities in the region, what now remains is to translate this insight into action.

## **Jill Muncy**

### ***Lebanon Police Reform Coordinator, US Department of State***

I would like to limit my comments on two specific aspects of international police work I had to deal with on a daily basis when I was serving in Kosovo as Deputy Commissioner of Operations from 2003 to 2005: the vetting and monitoring of local officers.

At the start of the intervention in Kosovo, the international community was faced with an acute crisis of public safety and, at the same time, with the broader question of how to deal with the existing security structures in Kosovo. In this situation, the decision was taken to include the establishment of the new Kosovo Police Service (KPS) in the broader demobilization strategy and allow a number of Kosovar Albanian fighters to join the force. However, this understandable decision for the rapid establishment of a functioning police service came at the expense of a proper vetting process. As a consequence, in my function as Deputy Commissioner, I had to dismiss numerous officers for crimes committed *prior* to their service with the KPS. In other words, I was firing officers who should never have been hired in the first place. I certainly agree with the notion that one should view vetting as a constant process which goes beyond pre-hiring checks, but this approach must not distract us from the vital importance of the initial vetting procedure. Since we will subsequently invest considerable resources in training local officers, it is worth being highly selective in who receives this training.

I think this experience illustrates a well known dilemma of international peace operations that has already been mentioned by Deputy Commissioner Jahjaga: the great difficulty of reconciling long-term and short-term goals. In this case, the short-term need to provide a visible police presence and demobilize existing military structures was met at the cost of the long-term aim of setting up a police service

meeting international standards. The history of the KPS also reinforces another issue that was mentioned in previous discussions: the crucial importance of mission pre-planning. It is the pressure to get local police on the ground as soon as possible that often results in a less than stellar product. With better pre-planning procedures in place, the international community could reduce this pressure and therefore be more careful during the pre-hiring vetting procedures. Unfortunately, I do not think that we are doing enough in this respect yet.

I am convinced that, just as with vetting, it is difficult to overstate the importance of monitoring. It is essential for building capacity, fostering transparency and combating corruption. It ensures—for as long as there is an international presence—that local police adhere to the high democratic and professional standards to which they have been trained at such great expense. The international monitoring of the KPS consists of two elements. Firstly, after their initial training the new local police are sent into the field under the guidance of a Field Training Officer for a number of weeks. Secondly, the performance of all local officers is constantly followed by the International Monitoring Unit (IMU). It is here that, in my opinion, most problems occurred. Among other things, this can be put down to the view held by international staff that the IMU constituted a second-rate unit, achieving little and offering few rewards for its members. In fact, the IMU's reputation was so low that international officers had to be forced to serve in it. The answer, found in 2005, was to completely reform the monitoring program and accord its work a much higher profile. This in turn increased the demand amongst highly qualified internationals to join the Unit. As a result, the performance of the IMU has improved markedly.

**James Lyon**

***Special Balkan Adviser, International Crisis Group (ICG), Belgrade***

Let me begin by pointing out that I speak here not as an expert who is directly involved in police reform, but rather as an outside observer who has been following the developments in the Balkans closely since the mid-1990s. From this viewpoint, I am frankly struck by the fact that the recommendations under discussion in this Workshop are the same that have been debated for years by countless other groups at various levels. This leads me to the conclusion that the lessons arising from the numerous international interventions since the end of the Cold War have not been properly learnt. Unfortunately, the international community does not seem to follow the golden rule of making every mistake only once.

Let me hasten to add that in my experience the fault in most cases clearly lies with the political leadership. Important lessons are being learnt at the operational level on the ground, yet they either do not filter up to the national governments and the headquarters of international organizations, or they do not accord with their political goals. This failure is particularly amazing as there are a number of success stories. In the Balkans, for example, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in 1996-1998 can provide many useful lessons. It had a realistic, clearly defined mandate which was implemented with determination by a mission that was properly managed by a strong leadership.

From the Balkan experience post-1996, one can develop a number of recommendations that can be applied to all types of international interventions. The first I would like to offer concerns the relation between the police and the military. International police intervention occurs in situations where the rule of law, including the local police

and judiciary, has completely broken down. In fact, very often the local security apparatus will be a significant part of the problem and the international mission will have to make a very difficult decision about whether any form of cooperation with the existing structures is possible. In this security vacuum, the roles of the military and police are frequently blurred by practical circumstances. Too often one hears the phrase "that's not a job for the military", particularly in national capitals where there is an understandable—but in this case misguided—resistance to having soldiers involved in law enforcement. In practice in post-conflict societies, the fledgling local police requires an aggressive back-up by the international military presence.

To coordinate the interaction between the military and the police it is in my opinion vital to have a unified chain of command. By this I mean specifically that the military and the police are ultimately controlled by the same individual and that this control function is clearly spelled out in the mandate and implemented in practice. From UNPROFOR onwards, wherever there were dual chains of command the result was confusion and endless discussions about responsibility.

I further believe, that the international community must not set withdrawal timetables. The mission's termination must be driven by benchmarks, not by political and financial fatigue. A look at the situation in Bosnia during the last months will demonstrate that as soon as the international community announces its intention to leave without achieving specific benchmarks, the reform process will start to move backwards.

Recent events in Bosnia also serve to illustrate my next point: the personality and experience of the top mission leadership, particularly the head of the mission, is extremely important in determining the mission's success. Simply put: only good leadership gets good results. The records of the different High Representatives and SRSGs in charge



of OHR and UNMIK, for example, show a clear correlation between the quality of leadership and progress on the ground. I am of course aware that appointment to these positions is subject to intense pressure from member state capitals, but the responsible international organizations simply must pay greater attention to the qualifications of the candidates. National vanities must not be allowed to endanger the success of international peace operations.

Finally, a few remarks about the international personnel serving in police missions. It should be obvious that in order to make a positive contribution to both, law enforcement and capacity-building in post-conflict areas, international police officers need to be well prepared. This calls for a significant investment in training programs on the part of contributing states. That this investment brings results is illustrated by the example of Italy. In my experience, the Italian Carabinieri are consistently the best prepared and therefore most efficient force in Balkan police missions. I would therefore encourage other states to learn from this example and train their officers to similarly high standards.

Given the cost and time for pre-mission training of international policemen, it makes no sense to waste this effort by sending the officers back home after only six or twelve months in the field. No one with practical experience on the ground would dispute that it takes at least several months for any international staff member to adapt and become truly productive. As a consequence, rotations need to be lengthened to two or three years.

**Martin Ney**

***Deputy Director-General for the United Nations and Global Issues,  
German Federal Foreign Office***

My presentation, based on my experience as Senior Deputy High Commissioner in Bosnia-Herzegovina until March 2006, will examine the questions how to create both a safe environment and sustainable police structures and what role local actors can play in this.

In order to win the active participation of local police officers in the twin processes of crime prevention and police reform, it is imperative that the links between new institutions and alternative power structures are broken. This is often very difficult to achieve in practice. In Bosnia, for example, organized crime and a part of the ethnic-nationalist party organizations are still linked with police structures.

The first step in dismantling this well lubricated machine is to convince pro-reform local actors—police officers, prosecutors and judges—that they can win the battle. Commissioner Curtis has already made this point but it is worth repeating: local security sector officials are highly risk-averse, and rightly so. If they feel that they are risking their families' safety without achieving anything when tackling corrupt politicians or organized crime bosses, they will remain passive onlookers. This leads to two conclusions. Firstly, the entire law enforcement system—from the police who investigate and make the arrest, to the public prosecutors who present the case in court, to the judiciary which sentences the offenders—must be reformed simultaneously. Secondly, the international police and military presence must be willing to offer assistance, particularly in high-profile, high-risk cases.

The second necessary step to break the connection between the police and illicit structures in Bosnia is to reorganize police districts so that they are no longer identical with ethnic territorial districts. The pres-

ent situation cements the interdependence of police and corrupt local politicians and is the explanation for the almost total resistance of Republika Srpska to police reform efforts by the international community.

The central importance of creating local ownership is the second issue I would like to raise. I am convinced that local actors will only participate in the reform process if they have a sense of shaping and controlling it. But what can the international community do to engender this sense of ownership? Firstly, it must find a sensible balance between intervention and non-intervention because there is unfortunately a trade-off between the speed of reforms and local ownership. The involvement of local actors slows down the pace, however it is vital if local ownership and sustainability is to be fostered. As every practitioner is aware, there is no simple way of achieving a satisfactory balance; judgments must be made on a case-by-case basis. Also, the decision to intervene is not binary, there are many possible degrees of international involvement. One can, for instance, talk to local actors in private to influence a certain issue, or give a press conference, or prepare draft proposals on the matter, or impose legislation under the Bonn Powers. The general recommendation I would make from my own experience is to refrain from intervention for as long as possible, but always to remember that the international mission was only created because local ownership went badly wrong in the past.

The international community has a significant incentive at its disposal in its efforts to create local ownership, namely the desire of the great majority of the population in the Balkan countries to join the European Union. In Bosnia, an amazing 85% are in favor of EU membership. It must be made very clear to our local counterparts at all levels that EU membership is conditional on a broad range of sustainable reforms and that this can only happen if they take full

responsibility for the process. Recent events have shown that there is a general disenchantment in the EU itself with the prospect of further enlargement, and that EU member states will not accept lower standards. On the other hand, the EU has to keep the option of membership open for qualified applicants. As I have said on numerous occasions in Brussels, there are two ways of solving the problems of Bosnia for the international community: the expensive way—which is what we are doing at the moment—and the very expensive way which is closing the door to Europe, followed by a failure of the reform process in Bosnia which could lead to an acute security crisis on the borders of the EU necessitating a new, massive international intervention.

## **Discussion**

Three issues were at the center of the debate: the need to improve police planning capacities; the pros and cons of longer rotations for international police officers; and the tension between adapting international policing strategies to specific local conditions and the need for standardization.

### **The Achilles' Heel: Police Planning Capacity**

There was almost unanimous agreement among participants about what one practitioner described as "the Achilles' heel of all international police operations": the shortage of experienced planning experts in the field. Most senior police officers present confirmed that this bottleneck seriously hampers their efforts and in some cases jeopardizes the success of police missions. As on several previous occasions during the Workshop, the point of their critique was not a generally low quality of officers deployed by contributing nations, but rather the low number of officers with a specific skill profile. They reported that the great majority of international police staff are highly experienced patrol officers but that they were desperate to find competent personnel for their planning teams, often having to appoint individuals they knew were not fully qualified for the task. As a result, the planning staffs of international police components are often hard pressed to handle their many duties. One expert cited the example of the UN Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Haiti (MINUSTAH): each fields between 1,300 and 2,000 officers, yet their planning units only have a staff of ten or twelve. As a comparison, he mentioned that a similar-sized military unit would have a staff of over 100.

The recommendations made to overcome this key obstacle targeted both, the contributing countries and the international organizations. At the national level, it must first be determined whether the source of the problem is ignorance among the political decision-makers, or misconceptions about the seriousness of its consequences in the field, or a faulty national pre-selection process for deployable officers, or, finally, a shortage of suitable experts in contributing countries. The first two possible causes should be addressed by a vigorous campaign of information led by respected experts with mission experience.

Furthermore, in many cases the national recruitment systems for international police officers are in need of improvement. Any such system will necessarily be based on personal willingness and availability, but recruiting agencies must take greater account of the actual needs of field missions and expend more effort to identify and recruit officers with suitable skill profiles. One former police commissioner summed up the problem: "I have told our partners many times: 'I don't need an extra 20 patrol officers, I need one planning expert.' Yet I get sent more patrol officers".

The most serious potential obstacle is the shortage of planning experts in national police forces leading to an understandable reluctance by superiors to deploy these key officers abroad. Here, the solution is to lobby for an increase in national planning capacities, which should be in the self-interest of the police services themselves.

As for international organizations, Workshop participants recommended certain similar steps: an improved communication of the requirements of field missions to member states and a refinement of the organizations' recruiting processes. In addition, several experts called for the establishment of permanent headquarters for police missions including a planning staff by international organizations. This measure would not only increase the number of experienced

planners, it would also enhance cooperation within police components by spreading common doctrines and procedures and shorten the time it takes to deploy a new mission. One participant reported that the UN is currently looking at the option of developing such a standing headquarters and urged other international organizations to follow their example.

### **Length of Rotation**

The discussion next turned to a question closely linked to the shortage of police planners and other highly qualified specialists: the duration of the deployment of international officers to the mission area. Various arguments were presented in favor of international officers serving as long a tour of duty as possible: long mission service is a precondition for developing an understanding of the situation on the ground; it ensures the continuity of training and institution-building activities; it aids communication and cooperation with other local and international actors which are based on personal acquaintance and trust; and it helps to alleviate the problems caused by the low numbers of officers with key skill profiles.

With regard to the last point, some participants retorted that longer rotations might on the contrary actually aggravate the shortage of planning and other specialists. Such officers are often in short supply even in developed countries and national governments are already unwilling to part with these valuable assets. Longer tours of duty in peace operations might well increase this reluctance. It was also argued that the introduction of long tours of duty for internationals might reduce the flexibility needed to recruit and replace personnel to suit a changing situation on the ground.

Furthermore, some experts cautioned that a lengthening of rotations can in some cases lead to a loss of objectivity of international officers,

seriously damaging their role as impartial actors in the mission area. The more time staff spend in the field, the more likely it becomes that they will form a personal attachment to their professional and social environment. In a few instances, officers have even set up what a participant described as "parallel family structures" during lengthy deployments. Even in mild cases, such behavior harms the work of the entire international peace operation. This is particularly true in ethnically divided communities, where an officer with known ties to one group becomes unacceptable as a partner to the other and his attitude is easily taken as representative of all international personnel.

### **Standardization or Custom-Made Solutions?**

A further point of contention among participants was the tension between the imperative of tailoring each mission to the individual requirements of the host country and the necessity of developing common policies and operating procedures among actors in an international intervention. Some argued that experience demonstrated the vital importance of country-specific approaches. Such a targeted strategy can only be formulated through an elaborate planning process based on a thorough analysis of the situation. This would allow the elaboration of a common agenda suited to the situation at hand amongst the participating international organizations, individual member states, and military, police and civilian components. In addition, an extended pre-mission planning phase would allow for the participation of local political and civil society actors. This early local involvement is generally accepted as critical for providing both a better fit of international activities to local needs and ensuring a smooth transition to local ownership later on.

Other discussants agreed in principle to the importance of country-specific planning and local participation but warned that these must



not be allowed to lead to a slow response by the international community to an ongoing crisis situation. Even more important, in their view, was the need to improve the mission-readiness of all elements in an international peace operation. The goal is to achieve a workable degree of interoperability on two levels: firstly among the different national contingents *within* the individual military, the police and the civilian components, and secondly *between* these three components. This challenging task can only be accomplished through the development of standardized policies and modules for pre-deployment training by international organizations which must then be implemented by national governments for their pre-selected personnel. Even if some flexibility is built into the system, it is obvious that such standardization comes at the expense of a perfect fit to local conditions. All the same, in the opinion of its advocates, the numerous examples of misunderstandings and lack of cooperation among the different elements in peace operations show that this is an unavoidable trade-off.

## **Panel III**

### **Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Palestine**

**Peter Miller**

*Director West Africa Police Program, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and former Police Commissioner, UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)*

I would like to base my presentation largely on my experiences during the 18 months I served as Police Commissioner in East Timor. Some of the most difficult situations we faced as international police officers during this time were created by the role of political considerations—both at the local and the international level. These affected decisions that police are usually trained to make in a purely technical, objective fashion. The UN was, for example, strongly criticized by the East Timorese media and public for retaining 70 officers on the newly founded East Timorese police force who had already served during the period of Indonesian rule. A number of these officers were suspected of having committed serious human rights violations in the past. Any such cases that were brought to our attention were investigated and none of the allegations were substantiated. As a matter of fact, most of the former Indonesian police fought as part of the resistance movement from within the system. Nevertheless, they were often not accepted by the Timorese people because of their link to the past.

There was also considerable political pressure to hire those ex-guerrillas who had not found a position in the new East Timorese armed forces into the local police force. In my opinion, however, someone who is not suitable for service in the army is probably equally unsuitable as a police officer. We resisted waiving the entrance standards for this group. As a result there were not only angry street

protests against the international presence, but even a number of armed attacks on UN personnel. These were facilitated by the fact that the preceding DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) program had not been very successful and there were still a large number of weapons available in the country.

The perception of many Timorese people was that the Timorese Police were loyal to and supported the Prime Minister Mari Alcatiri, while the military forces supported the president Xanana Gusmao. This situation placed the international officers in a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, for reasons both of legitimacy and of capacity-building, local officers had to be involved in intelligence-gathering activities. On the other hand, experience showed us that sharing politically sensitive information with local counterparts was problematic. Unfortunately, I cannot offer a general solution to this dilemma, I can only suggest dealing with each individual case on its merits.

The second important point I would like to stress has been mentioned by several speakers already. It concerns the necessity of rebuilding the other two pillars of what has been called the "rule of law triad" at the same time as the police, namely the judiciary and the correctional system. While lip service has regularly been paid to this principle for a long time, in practice very little was often done in these two areas, and the correctional system is even today treated as the stepchild of rule of law reform programs. As a result, corrections are in many cases completely dysfunctional with broken down facilities and insufficient numbers of properly trained officers. In East Timor, both the police and even the armed forces on many occasions had to be deployed in support of correctional officers.

A third issue I want to address is basic training. I firmly believe that training courses of eight or ten weeks are far too short to produce effective police officers. I realize that it is important to put officers

on the streets as quickly as possible in a post-conflict environment. However, quick deployment must not come at the expense of proper training. In my opinion, training courses should last at least 20 to 24 weeks. After that, follow-up field training courses at regular intervals are necessary. In addition, the new local officers need to be backed by experienced international officers, ideally by Formed Police Units (FPUs). Only after several years' service can a newly established unit be expected to deal with large scale public disturbances in a calm and professional manner. We learnt that lesson painfully in East Timor during the riots of 4 December 2002, when four demonstrators were shot by inexperienced local officers who overreacted under pressure.

In spite of that tragedy, I believe that UNTAET's planning for the hand-over of responsibility to East Timorese police was largely sound. There was to be a phased withdrawal from executive functions by UN police, conditional on the achievement of certain benchmarks by our local counterparts. The hand-over had already taken place in most rural areas. The most difficult area, the capital Dili, was still under international control. It is clear with hindsight that the critical flaw in the plan was the early withdrawal of the international Special Police Unit in September 2002 for financial reasons. Portuguese officers with an average of 15 years of service were replaced by East Timorese officers with less than twelve months experience. It is hardly surprising that this inexperienced group acted improperly when faced with violent demonstrators on 4th December, opening fire on the crowd.

Finally, in my opinion, technical cooperation has to continue for an extended period after the passing of executive authority to local officials. That is an area where expertise normally takes a long time to develop. In addition, the funds for the necessary equipment are often not available.

**Franz Vogl**

***former Deputy Head, European Union Border Assistance Mission  
Rafah (EU BAM Rafah)***

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah (EU BAM Rafah) is one of currently nine ESDP police missions, possibly the one facing the greatest challenges and most exceptional difficulties. Perhaps the two least controversial principles of peacebuilding operations are that the deployment of a mission must be preceded by a political agreement between the parties to the conflict and that it must have a firm legal base. Unfortunately, both principles were violated in the case of EU BAM Rafah. As we soon discovered, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) had very different ideas about how the re-opening of Rafah Crossing Point in the Gaza Strip was to proceed. Even more disturbingly, it became clear that neither side had actually signed the "Agreement on Movement and Access" on which the mission was based. This fact gave both sides the perfect excuse to renege on any aspect of the paperwork they felt was not in its interest.

Three additional factors complicate daily work at Rafah. Firstly, for security reasons, the mission HQ could not be located within the Gaza Strip but was established in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, app. 60 km away. Second, access to Rafah Crossing Point is only possibly through one single gate controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) at the Kerem Shalom Crossing Point. Third, the crossing point can only operate as long as a "Joint Liaison Office" is staffed by both Israeli and Palestinian representatives. These arrangements allow both sides to obstruct the operation of EU BAM Rafah whenever they choose.

In spite of these complications, the first seven months of the operation—up to mid-2006—can be judged a success. The Rafah Crossing Point was open on a daily basis, allowing 350,000 persons to cross from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. That number represents approximately

25% of the entire population of the Strip; it reflects the enormous importance of the Crossing Point as a lifeline for this extremely densely populated and desperately poor territory. During this period, EU BAM Rafah therefore was largely able to fulfill its mandate which consists of: monitoring the PA's performance at the Rafah Crossing Point and the PA's implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing (APRC); fostering confidence building and cooperation between the parties; contributing to building capacity in the PA in order to ensure effective border control and surveillance. In the field of capacity-building, we concentrated on training the three Palestinian security forces present at Rafah Crossing Point—the Presidential Guard which provides local security, the PA border control officers and customs officers. Moreover the European Commission funded technical equipment for the crossing point.

On the other hand, there were also frustrations, caused by the non-executive nature of the mandate. Because of this we were unable to directly stop abuses—mainly a tacit toleration of smuggling activities—by Palestinian officials. In such cases, EU BAM officers could only point out the violation of the rules first to the Palestinian officer in question and then to the management of Rafah Crossing Point. When this approach brought no results, the Head of Mission of EU BAM Rafah had the final option to appeal directly to the President of the PA.

The situation for EU BAM Rafah changed completely when, following a raid by Palestinian militants on an Israeli border post on 25 June 2006, Israel closed all access to the Gaza Strip and the Joint Liaison Office most of the time. From that point, EU BAM Rafah monitors could only carry out their mandate on the occasion of exceptional openings of the crossing point. In the following months, the security situation deteriorated further, at first because of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) operations in the Gaza Strip and later also because of inter-Palestinian

violence between Fatah and Hamas gunmen. This development brought our activities to a complete stop.

Let me close with a suggestion for the future organization of Rafah Crossing Point. The current situation, where local security is provided by the Presidential Guard, border control functions are fulfilled by the Palestinian Border Police, customs clearance is handled by Customs, and the overall management of the facility is in the hands of a private company, is unsustainable. What is needed, is a single entity in charge of all operations at the Rafah Crossing Point under the direct control of the PA. To be partly self-financing, this entity should be funded through the fees generated at the Crossing Point, which are currently US\$ 15 per person. In addition, an international funding mechanism must be set up. These measures, and of course an improved security situation, are the preconditions for the successful continuation of EU BAM Rafah.

## **Tamba Pujeh Gbekie**

### ***Assistant Inspector General of Police, Regional Commander Western Area, Police Headquarters Sierra Leone***

I want to concentrate my remarks on the attempts by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) to engage local actors more successfully in the fight against all forms of crime but particularly organized crime. Organized criminal activities are on the rise both within Sierra Leone and also across our national borders. The main forms are:

- Human trafficking, particularly of women and children;
- Drug trafficking, both for local consumption and for export;
- Smuggling of a wide variety of goods, leading to an enormous loss of government revenue;
- Money laundering;
- White collar theft of public property, often involving key state functionaries.

It is widely acknowledged that increasing community participation in police work is a precondition for success in combating organized crime. At the same time, building a strong partnership between the public and the police presents a major challenge in Sierra Leone. The reason is the history of the SLP during the period of violent conflict, when politicization of the force, massive corruption and human rights violations were commonplace. Not only were the material assets of the SLP comprehensively destroyed during this time, so too was its reputation among citizens. Against this background, President Kabbah decided to make the complete physical as well as moral rebuilding of the police one of his government's highest priorities. For example, a rigorous vetting process was set up in order to regain the trust of the people. This procedure guarantees that no officers who have committed human rights abuses, are allowed to serve in the SLP.



Learning from past mistakes, it was also decided to adopt the concept of "Local Needs Policing" with the aim of involving the community in developing policing priorities. This is not only an effective way to build bridges between the police and the citizens, it is also a useful tool to gather valuable intelligence. Part of this concept was the introduction of "Local Police Partnership Boards" in all Police Divisions in the country. Members of these boards are community groups such as youth, student and other civil society organizations, trade unions and traditional leaders. They assist the police in a variety of ways, from providing information to forming neighborhood watch groups in those areas where there is still little or no police presence. Finally, the SLP has also formed a Community Relations Department and a Media and Public Relations Unit to educate and inform the citizens about the activities of the police.

A further central element of police reform consists of improving relations with other actors in the security sector. Regular contacts have been established with the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the Prison Service and the Office of National Security. This constitutes a great improvement over past practices. Of particular importance given the history of Sierra Leone, is the agreement reached on a document called "Military Aid to Civil Power". This lays out in detail the division of labor between the armed forces and the police, establishing the principle of police primacy in internal security matters. SLP and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) also conduct regular training exercises together, especially in the field of border control.

Finally, the SLP has also re-invigorated its International Police Crime Bureau which serves as a link to other national law enforcement agencies and plays a crucial role in the fight against cross-border crime.

In spite of the advances just outlined, it must also be admitted that a number of very serious challenges remain that endanger the success of police reform in Sierra Leone. Certainly the most immediate one is lack of funding for buildings, equipment, training activities among others. The economy of Sierra Leone is still very weak and, as a result, government revenue is not nearly sufficient to cover expenditures. Some of the shortfall has until now been covered by international donors. However, as the attention of the international community shifts to other, more urgent crises, financial support for Sierra Leone might be reduced in the future, leading to an acute financial crisis.

A closely connected issue is the very poor conditions of service for police officers. Wages are so low that it is very difficult to compete successfully with the private sector for well educated recruits. In addition, as long as officers are not paid a wage that allows them to support themselves and their families, corruption will remain a serious problem.

The third challenge threatening the success of police reform has already been mentioned by a number of speakers with regard to other countries. It concerns the lack of progress in rebuilding the judicial and correctional systems. To an even higher degree than the SLP, the judiciary and the Prison Service suffer from a lack of basic equipment, broken down facilities, and low personnel strength. This leads to a large back-log of court cases, overcrowded prisons, and a susceptibility to corruption. Clearly, the reform of all three sectors must proceed simultaneously or the shortcomings in one sector will cancel out any achievements reached in the others.

## Discussion

In the discussion, the participants focused on three issues: first, the effect of higher salaries on police reform; second, the need for regional strategies in peace operations; and third, the connection between state failure, societal break-down and development in post-conflict societies.

### **Higher Local Police Salaries: Silver Bullet or Millstone?**

The issue of salaries in the security sector was described by some participants as a central strategic challenge to police reform in peace operations. In their view, experiences from the Balkans, West Africa and Afghanistan showed that combating organized crime was bound to fail unless local officers were paid with a sufficient salary as personal financial difficulties would always leave officers susceptible to corruption. In the words of one participant: "We can do all the institution-building and hold all the training courses we want; without higher salaries police reform just will not work." It was also pointed out that poor conditions of service made it very difficult to recruit well-educated men and women into the security services against the competition of the private sector, or to stop them from leaving after having been trained at the expense of the international community.

However, given the financial constraints of most post-conflict societies, other experts were skeptical of the sustainability of higher police salaries. They warned that the creation of excessive entitlement programs for public employees had in many cases led to long-term dependency on the financial support of international donors. It was also argued that higher incomes were not a panacea for the

challenges of police reform. One participant quoted the example of Haiti in the years 1994-97, when salaries were raised tenfold without achieving the goal of bringing the Haiti National Police up to international standards. Finally, one participant cautioned that the overall salary structure of public employees in a given country had to be taken into account. In Afghanistan, for example, monthly pay for a police officer is US\$ 70, which is not only insufficient in itself but also lower than that of a soldier (US\$ 100), causing resentment among police officers. Since a teacher in Afghanistan earns only US\$ 30 per month, it is clear that the salaries of all groups should ideally be raised; yet this is financially impossible. Raising the pay of only one group is hard to justify, both morally and politically.

### **Subregional Strategies**

Several participants called on the international community to develop and implement regional strategies for peace operations, preferring this to a piecemeal approach focusing on individual countries in a region. This was seen as particularly promising where there were international missions in neighboring countries. In fact, some progress has been made in recent years in improving cooperation between UN operations in the Balkans and West Africa, especially in the area of border security. The cases of Afghanistan, Haiti, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa, however, were cited as examples of the need for a more systematic effort. It is now, for example, widely accepted that criminal networks and armed gangs escape prosecution and spread conflict across wide areas thanks to their capacity to move freely across porous borders which cannot be properly policed by weak central governments. This is often—particularly in Africa—helped by the fact that arbitrary colonial-era borders intersect ethnic and language boundaries.

A further problem created by the presence of an international peace operation that needs to be addressed is the phenomenon of "DDR shopping". It consists of smuggling weapons into countries offering an attractive reward for surrendering them in the context of a disarmament program. One possible solution is the further improvement of the cooperation between international missions in neighboring countries on the one hand and regional governments on the other. Some participants also called for the provision of international assistance to states bordering a conflict zone with the goal of improving their ability to control their borders.

### **"Failed Societies"?**

The situation in all the case studies discussed in this panel is, or was, characterized by a high degree of intra-community violence, social disintegration and economic collapse. Some participants went so far as to describe Haiti and Sierra Leone, in their different ways, as examples not simply of state failure, but societal failure. Traditional recipes for peacebuilding which give a large role to civil society to supplement state structures were bound to fail in such an environment. Short-term international interventions could scarcely hope to scratch the surface of the problem, even though they could be described as fulfilling their limited mandates. As one participant put it: "We have now had seven 'successful' missions in Haiti. If we do not address the underlying conflicts in Haiti's society, we will have to undertake yet another 'successful' mission in a few years' time".

Other experts agreed on the scope of the challenges facing international peace operations in such environments but felt that the description of Haiti or Sierra Leone overstated the case. They were more optimistic about the positive impact that a combination of targeted mandates—particularly in the area of rule of law—and development assistance could have. In their view, public job creation

schemes and a functioning justice sector could form the basis for long-term recovery even in the most dysfunctional post-conflict societies. They were contradicted by some members of the panel who felt that development assistance and justice sector reform, while obviously crucial, were not sufficient to guarantee success. They pointed to the mixed record of decades of development efforts in providing long-term economic growth and employment even in countries without a history of violent conflict and state break-down. In their view, all ordinary obstacles to development were greatly magnified in a post-conflict setting, in addition to the number of unique challenges. One participant summed up this position: "The standard recommendation 'Create stability and justice and the jobs will follow!' will just not work in a place like Haiti".

## **Panel IV**

### **Police Reform in Afghanistan**

**Helmut Frick**

***German Special Ambassador for Police Sector Reform,  
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Kabul***

I believe that we are currently at a turning point in Afghanistan and developments there need to be monitored very closely by the international community. The police reform program was started five years ago in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Taliban, and from that point until the spring of 2006 the security situation improved step by step. Since then, however, the re-emergence of armed resistance in the South and East of the country has threatened the security as well as the political progress achieved over the first years of the intervention. We are back to a partial conflict situation, jeopardizing our efforts to rebuild the Afghan National Police (ANP) and other security forces, the attempts to disarm illegal militias, and the anti-narcotics effort. I believe that, as a consequence, we have to think seriously about modifying the "light footprint" approach followed until now by the international community, and resort to a more robust "heavy footprint" approach if we want to preserve the achievements already made.

In turning to lessons learned from Afghanistan, I would like, then, to focus primarily on the issue of the mandate. Since the start of our police reform work, we have not had a firm legal or procedural base. Initially, the work was therefore based on pragmatism and *ad hoc* solutions. As a result, the international community started the police reform program without sufficient financial and personnel resources. Nevertheless, until last year, considerable progress was achieved even

without a fully fledged mandate. We simply defined certain key sectors to bolster within the almost completely destroyed Afghan police structures and went ahead. A rank and pay reform was implemented, the top leadership was replaced, and efforts to combat corruption within the police service and to restructure the administrative apparatus were instituted.

But I believe that in the current critical situation, the lack of a strong, formal mandate is actually starting to become a deficit. This lacuna, however, might also be an opportunity to scrutinize our past approach and think hard about what we have to change in order to protect achievements already made and to continue making progress. In that sense, the EU initiative to become more involved in Afghanistan is very timely, and so is the decision by the US government to strengthen its engagement in rebuilding the ANA, both in terms of personnel and of material resources.

If a new mandate for police reconstruction were to be formulated, a number of points would need to be considered:

First, the timeframe of our engagement has to be clarified. During 2001 and 2002, the general consensus appeared to be that an effort of five or six years was needed. Past experience and recent developments have changed that assessment. The international community will have to face the fact that it will realistically have to support the police reform progress for ten to fifteen years. Apart from the current volatile security situation, the sheer size, complex geography and cultural diversity of Afghanistan, the main limiting factor for quick progress is the lack of what I would call "absorptive capacity" within the infant police structures of the local police. In fact, I have been told repeatedly by high-ranking police officials "please go slow, we are only able to deal with so much change at a time." This story should serve as a reminder that international best practices in policing are not easy for



a country emerging from 30 years of conflict to adopt, even if there is a general willingness to do so.

A second vital element of a new mandate would be the integration of rebuilding military, police and other law enforcement agencies. While there was of course some coordination between relevant actors in Afghanistan, there is a need for a more coherent and interlinked approach. The lack of a functioning justice system is another major problem that needs to be addressed. Closer coordination, however, must be based on a clear delineation of roles and a clear division of labor, particularly between the military and the police. The implementation of civilian police concepts in post-conflict territories has, in my opinion, been one of the great achievements of the international peacekeeping missions since the early 1990s. It would be regrettable if the line between civilian and military responsibilities became blurred again in Afghanistan. I see a danger of such a development under the current pressure from the insurgency in the southern and eastern provinces.

Finally, we need a much broader system of mentoring for ANP officers. We have achieved a solid training base, but I believe that if we want to create sustainable structures, the training programs will have to be followed by extensive mentoring by qualified international officers. This is an area where the planned EU involvement could make a real difference.

**Colonel Charles Barham**

***Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-A), Kabul***

I would like to begin by commenting on the title of our panel: "Building Local Police Capabilities in the Context of Rule of Law and Good Governance". When we started reforming the local police, there was no rule of law in Afghanistan. There was tribal law that varied by location. There was also no good governance, there was a culture of corruption that had been developed over generations. Coupled with over two dozen years of neglect, this resulted in a government where the ministries were essentially dysfunctional. We are now slowly beginning to overcome this environment due to the efforts of Afghans like Ali Ahmad Jalali and Abdul Hadi Khalid and their partners from the international community. My first point therefore is that local and international actors must consider the environment in which their efforts occur. Equally, it is imperative to remember that any "universal" lessons drawn from these efforts are actually likely to contain elements that are specific to the particular environment in which they were made.

Next, let me present to you a quick overview of our collective achievements. Today, Afghanistan has over 50,000 fully trained and equipped police officers. Through the rank reform program we are on course to replace corrupt and incompetent leaders at all levels. These efforts do not stop at the police force, they include the institution that controls and sustains it—the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). In addition, through the pay reform program, Afghanistan's policemen are receiving a full month's pay for a month's work rather than having several layers of corrupt officials taking money off their salaries. This is unprecedented in Afghanistan's history. This was partly achieved by using disbursement via electronic transfer rather than cash, no small feat in a country where banks simply do not exist in many areas and where electricity is a scarce resource.

Yet, as Ambassador Frick mentioned, the operational dynamics have changed in recent months. Not long ago, we were reforming the security sector while fighting a war on the side. Now we are fighting a war while reforming the security sector on the side. Radical anti-government elements have regrouped and are resuming their attacks. Sanctuaries in Pakistan and Iran, coupled with porous borders, provide these forces with a crucial advantage. On several occasions, Afghan government forces were overwhelmed and out-gunned by the insurgents. Policemen armed with 9mm pistols found themselves engaging an opponent armed with AK-47s and grenade launchers; when you bring a knife to a gun fight, the outcome is generally not in question. As a consequence, we determined that it was necessary to both enhance and enlarge ANP capabilities. Its officers are being provided with better personal weapons and other equipment and are receiving improved training. We are also expanding the force, extending the goal from 62,000 to 82,000 trained and equipped officers.

The key to success against this altered background is improved field training and mentoring. To illustrate the difficulties we are facing in this regard, let me mention that in Kosovo the ratio of local police trainees to international mentors at one point reached a ratio of 2:1. In Iraq the ratio is about 28:1. In Afghanistan today it is about 90:1. We have conducted a review of our requirements in this field and have estimated that approximately 2,500 additional international trainers and mentors will be required, spread across the MoI and all sections of the police force. We see these as yet un-resourced requirements as an ideal opportunity for the international community to take a larger role in police reform in Afghanistan. This support could take many forms, from a country taking responsibility for an entire branch such as the border police or the emerging Civil Order Police, to the offer of a handful of personnel to augment the mentoring capabilities at MoI headquarters.

**Ali Ahmad Jalali**

***former Minister of Interior, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan***

While I agree that Afghanistan shares some characteristics with other countries hosting an international peace operation, I want to emphasize that, in my view, it presents a special case. After 25 years of armed conflict in an already underdeveloped country, Afghanistan resembles a theme park of problems. Every single challenge facing the international community in post-conflict societies can be found there: warlordism, illegal militias, cross-border interference, organized crime in the form of the opium economy, break down of state institutions, a non-existent rule of law, and a lack of infrastructure and employment opportunities.

I believe it is first necessary to take a step back and take an unbiased look at the overall picture of the situation in Afghanistan before dealing with the specific issue of police reform. There are three specific facts I would like to point out:

Firstly, the Taliban were never a part of any peace settlement. Instead, after their defeat they withdrew to neighboring countries, regrouped and continued their armed conflict. As a result, the local and international actors are not so much engaged in peacebuilding as in peace enforcement in large parts of the country.

Secondly, the regional aspects of the conflicts have never been properly addressed. As I have already mentioned, Afghanistan's neighbors play a crucial role in the ongoing conflict, providing a safe haven to which the Taliban can withdraw in order to escape military pressure. Without the development of a regional strategy, therefore, there can be no solution to the security problem.

Thirdly, it is crucial to remember that, from the beginning, the international community followed what has been called the "light-foot-

print" approach in Afghanistan. This has also been described as "a quick and cheap military victory followed by quick and cheap peace-building". Although there is a general consensus that Afghanistan represents one of the most important battlefields in the global war on terrorism, I have to say that in my view, the international community has been unwilling to commit the necessary resources to the effort, both in the military and the civilian sphere.

To turn to the specific question of police reform in Afghanistan, the first question that one needs to answer is whether police reform is seen as an instrument for establishing the rule of law, and therefore a largely civilian task, or as an element of the fight against terrorism, and correspondingly a largely military task. It is clear that, from the beginning and under the influence of our international partners, the Afghan police was treated and was forced often as an extension of the military in the fight against the insurgency. I believe that was a mistake, as the central role of a professional and law-abiding police force in establishing the legitimacy of the government has been neglected.

I would also like to mention some of the challenges I faced as Minister of the Interior in the cooperation with our international partners. Most participants of the Workshop will be familiar with similar issues from other peace operations, either from the viewpoint of a local or of an international official.

Although I am very grateful for the continuing support of Germany and the United States in the rebuilding of the ANP, the program was not considered a top priority from the outset. Therefore it is several years behind. Further challenges are the frequent changes in course by the international community. There is now universal agreement that without parallel institution-building—the creation of administrative structures on all levels—training programs for individual police officers are ultimately useless. Unfortunately, the structures of

ANP were changed repeatedly by our various international partners such as the United States, Germany, and the UN. In 2003, with assistance mainly from Germany, we created largely civilian police structures based on long-term training programs for recruits. There was a first change in 2005 after the United States became more deeply involved in police reform and a new rank and salary structure was introduced. More recently, the Afghan National Police was re-modeled again, this time under strong military influence, and the Ministry of the Interior has been turned into a replica of the Ministry of Defence.

In this convoluted process, the necessary integrated approach to the reform of all institutions in the field of rule of law was neglected—something that has been mentioned repeatedly during this Workshop. The rule of law cannot be established without a simultaneous and coordinated rebuilding of the police, the justice sector and the penal system. The reality in Afghanistan, however, did not conform to this ideal: international support for the different aspects of rule of law was handled by different lead nations with different approaches to institution-building and training, different levels of financial resources, and different internal bureaucratic structures. As a result, progress has been very uneven and the various measures were mostly uncoordinated.

Finally, I would like to make a few comments about the effects of poor conditions of service on our police-training efforts in Afghanistan. It must be remembered that poorly paid, poorly equipped, and poorly led police officers have borne the brunt of the fight against the terrorists and insurgents. They have suffered more casualties than the Afghan National Army, the coalition forces, or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As a result of these conditions and the high casualty rates, by the best available estimate, only about 50% of the total 62,000 individuals trained in national and regional training centers are still with the Afghan National Police. The others have

either left the security forces completely or they have pursued the better paid options of service in the army, the militias of provincial governors, or the auxiliary police force.

**Abdul Hadi Khalid**

***Deputy Minister for Police and Security, Ministry of the Interior,  
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan***

In analyzing the recent development of police reform in Afghanistan, it is important to remember that after the fall of the Taliban government the country had no functioning police force whatsoever. Public security functions were filled by local armed groups that simply took over police stations. Numbering about 6,000 across Afghanistan, they included many criminal elements that harassed the population rather than upholding the law. These groups were often under the control of local warlords and refused to submit to the control of the central government.

This situation remained largely unchanged until Ali Jalali became Minister of the Interior in early 2003 and initiated a series of reforms. Training facilities were rebuilt and training programs were created. However, with the benefit of hindsight it must be acknowledged that the first training programs for police recruits proved insufficient, both in content and duration. This is again an example of the dilemma between quantity and quality already mentioned by several speakers at the Berlin Workshop: the necessity of quickly putting large numbers of police officers on the streets led to a neglect of training.

The international community failed to appreciate the gravity of this situation. It took until 2003 before a sufficient number of qualified police advisors were deployed to Afghanistan. This hesitant response led to delays in our efforts to increase both the quantity and quality of the security services. However, I would also like to point out that those international officers who did serve in Afghanistan over the years have in my experience generally worked very hard and contributed significantly to the progress that was achieved.



It is a moot point whether a policy privileging quality over quantity would have been more successful at stopping the growing insurgency from early 2006. Police bases were targeted and overrun, as were training facilities. The police were unable to resist, being in many cases poorly trained and equipped. The border police were hit particularly hard. Despite our efforts, the number of border police officers is still woefully short of what is required. With a border measuring 5,800 km, according to our estimates Afghanistan needs a force of 12,000 officers while in fact as of May 2006, we have only approximately 7,000 officers at our disposal. The numbers of the Civil Order Police are also low. In addition, their localized structure has hindered deployment to those areas in the South of the country where they are needed. As a consequence, there has been a revision of our previous policy with regard to the quantity of the different security services. New headline goals have been formulated, they are: 82,000 officers for the Afghan National Police, 18,000 for the Border Police, 46,000 for the Security Police, and 5,000 for the Civil Order Police.

As I have already outlined, apart from officer numbers we seriously have to address issues of individual performance and equipment. In too many cases, Afghan policemen are still hardly more than ordinary civilians wearing a uniform and carrying a gun. Corruption is widespread and is seriously affecting the legitimacy of the police force in the eyes of the population. In order to overcome these challenges, the Ministry of the Interior is currently reforming our police training programs at the seven training bases and the central police academy. Some training activities have also been contracted to private security companies, with DynCorp playing a prominent role. I must admit that I have some misgivings about the quality of the training provided by a number of these contractors. While the technical aspects of the courses are satisfactory, no efforts are made to improve the basic education of the recruits. Yet given the backgrounds of most young

men and women entering the Afghan police force, this is precisely what is needed. In addition, I believe our training programs have to instill a deeper sense of purpose in the recruits. They must understand their central function as future police officers in creating a sense of national unity in Afghanistan beyond ethnic divisions.

**Gerhard Schlaudraff**

***Counsellor, Division Police Reform Afghanistan,  
German Federal Foreign Office***

The EU has recently completed a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan to assess whether a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission could provide added value for police reform in Afghanistan, to identify where assistance is needed, and to assess the personnel resources required. Ordinarily, a fact-finding mission is only sent to the field *after* the political decision to deploy a full ESDP mission has been made. This case, however, was different as Afghanistan already hosts various international activities. Numerous police advisors, mainly from Germany but also from about a dozen other nations, work directly with the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), some in the various Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and some with the counter-narcotics program lead by Great Britain. One task of the fact-finding mission was, therefore, to determine what *additional* activities in the field of police reform could be useful. Furthermore, Brussels decided that there should first be clear indications by member states of the contributions they were willing to make before a final decision to deploy a mission would be taken. A situation like the one with regard to Darfur had to be avoided where a mission had been planned only to realize later that at most half of the necessary personnel would be available.

Many of the requirements in the field of police reform in Afghanistan were already outlined in the discussions this morning. These include:

- the need for better coordination among actors;
- the need for an overarching strategy for the "what" and the "how" i.e. for the goals to be achieved and the ways to achieve them;

- the need to address factors outside police reform which, nevertheless, have a strong impact on it such as political, religious or tribal structures and networks;
- the need to invest more effort and funds in certain critical fields such as criminal investigation and intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics;
- the need to create a link between police and justice sector reform, especially in the field of criminal justice;
- the need to improve border policing;
- the need to develop regional strategies against organized crime and insurgents;
- the need to mainstream the process of training, mentoring, and follow-up of graduates of the various training activities;
- the need to secure funding for the reconstruction of police infrastructure and equipment.

Let me now expand on a few of those points. The most important one is the coordination of international police reform programs currently taking place in Afghanistan. An ESDP mission could certainly facilitate cohesion as it would bring all involved European actors under one chain of command. However, there would still be independent actors, most notably the US, with whom a common approach would have to be found. Secondly, an ESDP mission would need to be tied very closely to the political processes shaping other areas of security sector reform that have a direct influence on police issues. Finally, the mission would have to be represented on the central, regional and provincial levels in Afghanistan. These three factors taken together indicate that the mission would have to have a certain critical mass in terms of size in order to be taken seriously and to be able to carry out its mandate.

I have also found that there is no consensus on either the international or the Afghan side on what the precise role of the Afghan police should be. The renewed insurgency in parts of the country has certainly added to this confusion. Police officers have at times been used for quasi-military operations, not only because they are locally available but also, I feel, because they are cheaper to replace: training costs for a soldier are five times higher than for a police officer. And once you have policemen stationed in an outpost regularly attacked by the Taliban, the question of whether police officers should be heavily armed becomes moot. Yet, while one has to accept that the police force will necessarily be more robust in an environment like Afghanistan, one should not forget that an overly militarized police can lead to problems in the areas of community relations and accountability.

The question how the international community reaches policy decisions concerning Afghanistan also has to be raised. For example, the London Compact of February 2006 reconfirmed the figure of 62,000 ANP officers. Some nations have expressed their intention to increase this number, but no definite decision has yet been taken, as far as I am aware. Since the international community is footing the full bill for the salaries of ANP officers, all contributors should have a say in this matter. Furthermore, it is unclear how the Afghan government will be able to pay for those numbers of policemen in the long run, once international assistance is withdrawn.

There is also the vexed question of how to coordinate our activities and determine who should be doing what. Some officials in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior are now in the awkward situation of having two mentors, one from the US and one from Germany, each pursuing rather different concepts of mentoring. The German mentor does typically not appear very often because he is double-hatted and has another job while the American mentor is likely to be present

every minute of the working day. It goes without saying that no one has actually asked the Afghans what concept they prefer. Similar issues arise with regard to the training concept. The police academy is, for example, offering a very good training program of three years for senior police officers and one year for non-commissioned officers. However, there is no follow-up for the graduates and it is sometimes unclear where they go. Furthermore, there is a disconnect between this program and the US efforts at the regional training centers. In many cases, we are currently far away from the minimum standard of 20 weeks training for police recruits that was mentioned here this morning with regard to Kosovo. In some instances recruits only receive 8 weeks of training. If we want to achieve sustainable success we have to improve coordination and also exchange views more frankly.

One precondition for identifying mistakes as early as possible and rectifying them promptly is to undertake more targeted recruitment and increased capacity-building for the international police staff. They need the capacity to identify political, as well as structural and organizational, issues that have an impact on police reform work. It also seems to me that while the military often has ways of making their voices heard, there is still some catching up to do on the police side. Maybe the deployment of experienced and respected senior police officers could address this imbalance. Finally, we need to develop a systematic approach to evaluating missions by outside experts. In fact, I believe that the activities of the international community in Afghanistan at this point would benefit from neutral scrutiny that could tell us what is working and what is not and how to improve our performance.

## **Discussion**

### **Light Footprint**

One issue that created some controversy during the discussion was the so called "light footprint" approach followed by the international community in Afghanistan in the past years. Several participants argued that a larger commitment of funds and personnel by the UN and other international actors from the start of the intervention would have brought better results in terms of security and development. The reliance on local militias and the lack of resources and political engagement in the critical early post-conflict phase had, in their view, permanently damaged security sector reform in Afghanistan, a failure that would take years to correct. Two effects in particular were described as dangerous: the entrenchment of local warlords in positions of power and the failure of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. One speaker referred in this context to what he called the "RDD" program: "immediate reintegration, followed by some demobilization, and then a little disarmament". The critics cited the current precarious security situation in parts of the country as proof that a fundamental change of policy towards deeper international involvement was imperative: "Light-footprint-time is over".

Other participants felt this criticism was based on hindsight and did not take sufficient account of the political realities of the years 2001 to 2003. They pointed out that the "light footprint" had been the unanimous decision of the United Nations and of all contributing countries, and had been welcomed by their Afghan partners. Its prime motivation had been to allow the development of a political system enjoying legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and this endeavor

had been largely successful. Security concerns had only later moved to center stage. Several speakers who had been closely involved in the process admitted that international resource commitment and policy formulation had been unsatisfactory but placed the blame on individual national governments. They reported that in spite of several attempts it had proved impossible to overcome national resistance to make more money or personnel available or implement a unified strategy for security sector reform. Only the recent surge in militant activity had created the necessary interest and led to increasing international engagement in police reform in Afghanistan.

### **Differing Approaches to Police Training**

The discussion next turned to the question of how to translate this obvious willingness by the international community to become more deeply involved. Capacity-building measures for Afghan police officers were identified as a key requirement, and ways of integrating the current uncoordinated activities in this field by various international actors were discussed in some detail.

Until now, police-training programs were mainly offered by the US and Germany. Whereas Germany has for several years concentrated on providing long-running, in-depth training for a small number of participants, the more recent US program trains much larger numbers of recruits in shorter courses. Some experts stated that these divergent approaches could easily be combined in a mixed system, with Germany focusing on senior officers and the US on new recruits. Others disagreed and pointed to two obstacles confronting the mooted integration of the two approaches. Firstly, the US has vastly greater funds at its disposal than other actors and, secondly, the US program is under military control through the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) while the German program is in the hands of civilian police officers. These participants cited past experience from



other peace operations where cooperation under similar circumstances between two unequal partners had proved problematic.

The fundamental wisdom of military involvement in police training was also questioned by a number of experts. As one of them put it: "Police officers should be trained by police officers". US military officers present felt it necessary to emphasize, however, that they had not pushed themselves into a training role. Instead, there was no other actor in Afghanistan at the time willing to invest the personnel and financial resources necessary to train a sufficient number of local security officers.

One further aspect of the US program that generated controversy was the use of private contractors for training delivery. Several participants criticized the work of certain contractors as both sub-standard and overpriced, and voiced general concerns over placing any aspect of public security in the hands of private, profit-driven companies. Again, US experts retorted that the urgency of the situation and the shortage of international police experts left no other option than to outsource parts of their training activities.

No consensus was achieved on the issue of the Afghan Auxiliary Police, a force with a projected strength of 11,000 officers that is currently being recruited by the US. It was defended by some participants as a necessary stop-gap measure that would be able to play a security role, thus freeing the Afghan National Police (ANP) for more complex assignments in remote areas. For simple, stationary guard duties the Auxiliary Police's short training program of two weeks was seen as sufficient by some. By contrast, several speakers warned of the creation of a badly trained force that largely consisted of persons that had previously been turned down as unfit for police service. One expert went so far as to call the Auxiliary Police "a new armed militia

in the making" and described its creation as a classic case of short-term necessity defeating long-term considerations.

### **An ESDP Mission—the Way Forward for Afghanistan?**

Against the background of the gaps in the international efforts at police reform in Afghanistan demonstrated in previous discussions, the Workshop participants went on to discuss the possible impact of the planned mission under the auspices of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Several participants felt that the key precondition was the formulation of a holistic strategy for police reform in Afghanistan among EU member states and, in particular, in coordination with the US. If this difficult requirement could be met, they felt that the strengths of the various actors would complement each other and create a positive dynamic. It was argued, for example, that CSTC-A had considerable funds at its disposal whereas EU member states had greater experience in recruiting police officers for peace operations and could thus fill existing personnel shortages in certain key areas in the current US-led police reform program. A number of speakers with personal knowledge of the situation also corrected the misperception that police reform work was currently impossible in Afghanistan due to security concerns. They reported that in the North and West of the country including the major cities Kabul and Herat—an area that contains the majority of the population—international staff are able to move freely and conduct training and mentoring.

However, one obstacle to a successful ESDP mission was also mentioned during the discussion. It concerned the effect of possible national caveats—the insistence by individual EU member states on deploying their personnel to specific areas. In theory, such caveats should not exist in the context of an ESDP mission as, in contrast to

ISAF, such a mission would not consist of individual national contingents. Rather, its staff would operate under a unified structure. In practice, however, several experts felt it likely that some EU member states would press for the deployment of their officers to certain areas. Those areas could be either where the security situation was considered particularly stable, or where the respective states were already engaged, for example in the form of PRTs. It was noted that such national caveats could have a very negative impact on the coherence of an ESDP mission and diminish its chances for success.

## Panel V

### Lessons Learned and Recommendations

**Michael Dziedzic**

*Senior Researcher, Research and Studies,  
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)*

#### **Division of Labor between the Police and the Military**

One of the central issues raised during the Berlin Workshop was the necessity of improving the division of labor between the international police and military and at the same time solving outstanding command and control questions. In order to articulate what I feel is an emerging consensus among participants, it is necessary to distinguish between the strategic, the operational and the tactical level.

Concerning the *strategic* level, there was broad agreement that command and control must firmly rest with the SRSG or, in non-UN operations, with an equivalent civilian functionary who is politically responsible for the implementation of the peace process. Only he or she must decide whether, when, and how to use force.

At the *operational* level, meanwhile, difficulties are caused by the fact that during the early stages of a peace operation the military is usually the only actor able to guarantee law and order. By necessity, it must therefore also perform policing functions. The question then arises when and how to transfer primacy for law enforcement functions back to the police. In certain areas, such as criminal investigations, the transfer must happen as soon as possible. We know from experience in Kosovo, among other places, that the military is simply not trained to interview witnesses and collect evidence that can later form the basis of court cases. However, even if it proves possible in

the future to deploy Formed Police Units (FPUs) from the very beginning of a mission, it is not guaranteed that the necessary investigative skill will be available since not all FPUs contain the necessary specialists. This is an issue that needs to be addressed in coming missions.

Generally speaking, primacy for internal security can be transferred from the military to the police as soon as a safe and secure environment has been established. However, experience has shown that the security situation in a mission-area can deteriorate very rapidly. It is therefore vital to have contingency plans in place that allow a rapid transfer of primacy back to the military to counter serious threats to public safety that are beyond the means of the police to contain. One element in this is the formulation of a Memorandum of Understanding outlining how such a "reverse transfer" is to be effected. In addition, there must be joint exercises to practice this transfer. It should also be clear that such a transfer of primacy back to the military can only come at the invitation of the civilian mission leadership.

At the *tactical* level, I feel that there was agreement about the usefulness of the Green Box/Blue Box concept mentioned earlier. This model allocates command and control in certain parts of the mission-area respectively to the military and to the police. It should therefore be adopted by all international organizations and taught in their various training courses as the UN is in the process of doing. This would greatly improve the interoperability of police and military units from a wide variety of contributing nations in a mission area. In addition, the UN has also agreed to adopt the standard military five-part planning process in their police training courses, making joint planning of tactical operations between police and military officers much easier in the future.

**Annika Hansen**

*Senior Analyst, Division for Analysis,*

*Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)*

### **Local Ownership**

The case-studies presented by the Berlin Workshop panelists and the discussions they aroused have again pointed to one of the key challenges in all post-conflict peacebuilding operations, namely the transfer of responsibility to local actors. While everybody agrees on the vital importance of local ownership, its successful implementation remains an unsolved problem. I would therefore like to present some of the dilemmas commonly facing international personnel in the field and then offer some possible solutions.

The *first* dilemma is encountered in identifying suitable local partners. Cooperating with local elites seems like an obvious choice but their members are often either opposed to reform or unacceptable to the international community because of their involvement in human rights violations during the period of conflict. Yet, in post-conflict societies alternative partners like reform-oriented groups often have no real power base in the population and are thus unable to function without continuous international support. There are many examples where empowering small constituencies has led to a rapid collapse of all achievements after the withdrawal of the peace operation.

A *second* dilemma is whether local counterparts should be involved from the early stages in defining the policy goals of a reform process or only later, during its implementation. It can of course be argued that presenting locals with a finished list of measures to be implemented by them is only a caricature of local ownership. Such an approach is likely to be counterproductive for two reasons. Firstly, because of the lack of local input, the imposed reform measures might

not be suitable for the host country. Secondly, local partners may not show much enthusiasm in the implementation of reforms they were not consulted on.

However, involving local actors in setting the reform agenda can also have severe drawbacks. Simply put: What if we don't agree with their choices for the future of their country? What if the international community can see that certain policies adopted by local partners have no chance of success? Should time and money be wasted in the name of local ownership or should the internationals intervene and overrule their local partners? This type of tension becomes even more pronounced in the area of rule of law. What if local partners are not willing to guarantee minority rights? In such a situation, the international community might be forced to choose between minimal human rights standards and local ownership.

The *third* dilemma is caused by the fact that local owners are not an amorphous mass. Just as in mature democracies, there are numerous social groups with conflicting interests in post-conflict societies. The international presence will often find itself caught between these interests. Which group should it then side with? The largest group, or the most vulnerable group in society, or maybe the one most inclined to cooperate with the peacebuilding effort? As in the other cases, there are unfortunately no easy answers to these questions, but everyone working in an international peace operation needs to be aware that he or she will need to confront them sooner or later. And of course the necessary decisions will have to be made under enormous donor pressure to produce results as soon as possible and with limited resources.

One way of addressing this issue is to differentiate between different groups of local owners such as members of government, our immediate local counterparts—in the case we are discussing here that would be

the local police. It is also necessary to distinguish the different degrees of ability and willingness to implement the necessary reforms shown by our local partners. Ideally, they are both willing *and* able. Unfortunately, that is not a very common combination in post-conflict societies. If the local owners are *willing but unable*, institution- and capacity-building measures must be implemented. The way to address *able but unwilling* local counterparts is through a political process that builds a consensus for reform, by persuasion and positive incentives if possible but some form of pressure may well be necessary. Local actors that are *neither able nor willing* obviously pose the greatest challenge. One might even argue that the international community should not expend scarce resources in such a hostile environment. There are many other cases where its time and money could be put to better use.

One clear lesson with regard to local ownership that has emerged from past experience is the necessity to start early—and to be patient. The dialogue with local partners has to start on the very first day and must be continuously pursued. Additionally, I would like to encourage international personnel to be more creative in their approach to engaging local owners. One talk over lunch every month or so is not local ownership. There are many other forms of consultation and shared authority that should be tried, including building on traditional local mechanisms. I think it is particularly important to allow local counterparts to work their own way through a problem, even if this includes making mistakes along the way.

I would like to conclude with some remarks on building capacity and institutions to create a more solid foundation for local ownership. Improving individual skills is certainly important, but I think that not enough attention is being paid to creating back-end institutions. The importance of creating good working conditions for the establishment a functioning police service has been mentioned several times already



during the Berlin Workshop. It follows that training programs for police officers must be accompanied by measures to consolidate the police administration that writes their pay checks and looks after their pension plans. Further, senior management capacity for strategic planning and threat assessments must not be neglected. The importance of this area is being increasingly recognized by the international community and there are now various strategic management training programs targeting such institutions.

There are two fundamental challenges the international community has not been able to tackle successfully. The first is that of putting the individuals it has trained and the structures it has created together in order to build a cohesive, professional police force that shares a common identity and institutional culture. The second is the even more fundamental challenge of embedding the police force into society as a whole. It was mentioned yesterday that, in certain parts of Afghanistan, the police can not operate because they are out-gunned by the criminals. In functioning societies, the power of the police officer does not come at the barrel of his gun. He can do his job because he is respected as the legitimate agent of the state, because he represents a moral authority to which citizens adhere. Unless we find a way to build this form of social consensus, our efforts cannot be successful.

**Michael Dziedzic**

***Senior Researcher, Research and Studies,  
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)***

### **Dealing with Spoilers**

I would like to add a few comments on local ownership. In my opinion the dismantling of illicit power structures is a precondition for handing over full responsibility to local actors. Training and equipping a police force that will only act as the enforcers of anti-reformist warlords and organized criminals is self-defeating.

It is therefore critical to understand these local power structures before we design any capacity-building programs. Each area has its own specific resource that fuels and funds these criminal networks. In Afghanistan, for example, the opium economy is at the heart of all problems, in Sierra Leone it is diamonds, in the Democratic Republic of Congo it is coltan and gold, in the Balkans it is smuggling and other organized criminal activities.

Typically, these power structures bring together a number of actors that were involved in wartime human rights violations and are all hostile to the peace settlement and the reform agenda. They include leaders of ethnically-based parties, former militia commanders and members of the security apparatus, as well as organized criminals. In many cases, these spoilers are one and the same.

It is sometimes difficult for the international community to acknowledge, but local experience clearly shows that conflict is very profitable. In many post-conflict societies, illicit wealth determines who governs. Therefore, if we want to remove the spoilers from power, we have to tackle the source of their wealth and influence. That is why I am convinced that in the presence of illicit power structures the light

footprint approach will not work. Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo can serve as an example.

The first policy recommendation that follows from this insight is the need for a thorough assessment of these structures. To this end, an effective intelligence-gathering capacity must be created, ideally during the planning phase of an operation or at the latest as soon as it is deployed. In Kosovo, for example, the international community set up the Criminal Intelligence Unit, the Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau, and the Joint Mission Analysis Center.

As a further step, the field missions must develop the ability to conduct intelligence-led operations. The UN has taken commendable steps in this direction in their new guidelines for Formed Police Units (FPUs). CoESPU is now offering training courses for Police Commissioners and the commanders of FPUs in UN operations where the implementation of such operations is exercised.

My third recommendation is to make the deployment of international judges, prosecutors and prison officials standard practice, both in executive and non-executive missions. Also, local intelligence reform must be recognized as a key element in security sector reform (SSR) and must be pursued far more vigorously than in the past.

Finally, I would urge the international community to rethink exit strategies. In my view the term itself is misleading, we need to formulate *transitional* strategies rather than *exit* strategies. It was mentioned earlier that even reform-minded locals will only cooperate with the international presence if they see a reasonable chance of success. If, however, the internationals are perceived as keen to leave as soon as possible or even set a fixed date for withdrawal, they put themselves at an enormous disadvantage because these local partners will withhold their support. Prospective local partners realize that the

spoilers will simply wait the internationals out and return to power as soon as they leave.

The first policy implication of this dynamic is that we have to convey our willingness to stay the course until the instituted reforms have had a chance to become firmly established. In practice, this means staying on even after most responsibilities have been handed over to local actors. The first day of local ownership cannot be the last day of the international presence.

It was also pointed out that the development of a strong civil society that can act as a safeguard against the politicization and criminalization of the security apparatus can take a generation or more. The second policy implication is, therefore, that the international community also needs to develop long-term safeguards that allow it to continue to monitor and support the reform process. This requires transparency and accountability on the part of the local institutions and a better understanding of where and how to embed international personnel in those institutions so that they can make corrective interventions if necessary.

## **Discussion**

In the discussion, the Workshop participants expressed broad agreement with the recommendations presented by the panelists. The focus of the debate was therefore on the problems and challenges arising for international personnel in the field.

### **Local Ownership: Early Start, Slow Results**

Several participants commented that while more attention had been paid in recent years to the transfer of responsibility to local actors, these efforts still do not begin early enough in the course of peace operations. They advocated the routine inclusion of local partners during the assessment and planning phases and the inception of programs aimed at facilitating the ultimate handover immediately after deployment to the mission area. It was also suggested that such programs be given a firm institutional basis, replacing their sole reliance upon individual initiatives. One expert advocated the creation of joint bodies from the police precinct to the ministerial level bringing together international personnel and their local counterparts as soon as local capabilities permitted.

It also became clear during the discussion that the international community's understandable calls for quick results often collided with the demands for capacity-building and local ownership. Some experts pointed out that international staff in peace operations sometimes felt compelled to intervene at the first sign of problems in the working of local institutions, thereby denying local officials the chance to gain experience by working through such difficulties on their own. They admitted that this kind of less interventionist approach would take longer and be accompanied by certain set-backs along the way.

However, they felt that these disadvantages were outweighed by the fact that the resulting local institutions were much better prepared to carry out their responsibilities after the eventual withdrawal of the international presence.

### **Dealing with Spoilers—an Unsolved Problem**

Some participants pointed out that the international community was often bound in its choice of local partners. In many cases, rebel groups with a record of human rights violations are part of the formal peace agreements that form the basis of the international presence. They need to be accommodated in the political process, otherwise the peace process will quickly unravel. In addition, the mandatory integration of their former members into the new local security forces may be part of the peace agreement, making a meaningful vetting and certification process aimed at excluding war criminals very difficult.

It became clear in the course of the discussion that dealing with spoilers is one of most demanding aspects of peace operations. This task alone makes the appointment of highly experienced mission leaderships able to count on the full backing of the international community an absolute necessity. Even then, progress in confronting criminal power structures and war criminals will take considerable time. But, as the example of the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, shows, the skilful handling of the political system can make it possible to first remove such figures from power and then hand them over to local or international courts to face the consequences of their crimes. Several participants pointed out that such a course of action was not only mandatory under international human rights legislation, it was also a vital step to end the culture of impunity in post-conflict societies and establish the credibility of the international peace operation.

## **Panel VI**

### **How to Improve Policing in Peace Operations: National, Regional and International Initiatives**

For the final panel, a number of participants representing international organizations as well as national institutions active in the field of post-conflict policing were asked to present a brief overview of their current and planned activities.

#### **Todd Wilson**

***Senior Advisor for Transitional Security, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State***

The establishment of the *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)* within the US State Department was mandated by the National Security Presidential Directive 44 of December 2005. Its mission is to lead, coordinate and institutionalize US government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife. Until now, the US, as well as other international actors, have undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an *ad hoc* fashion, creating from scratch the necessary tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. Our greatest challenge is therefore to institutionalize our lessons learned and make them readily applicable in the field.

To meet this challenge, S/CRS has developed three operational models. The first is the *Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group* that aims to integrate all US civilian and military actors in a post-conflict situation at the strategic level. Second, on the operational

level, a civilian *Interagency Planning Group* is tasked to insert civilian expertise into the US military regional command structures responsible for a given intervention from the very start. The third operational model is the *Advanced Civilian Team* which exists on the tactical level. These teams will allow us to deploy civilian experts as early as possible (conceivably embedding them with the military intervention), to start developing a first response capacity, to refine the pre-mission assessments, and to continue the integration of efforts between civilian and military actors.

A further focus of S/CRS is the improvement of US recruitment capacities for civilian personnel. Three separate pools are being developed: The *Advance Response Corps* currently comprises 30 senior experts with both functional and general expertise. It will be expanded to c.100 experts by 2008. The *Stand-By Corps* consists of a database of US foreign service officers with experience in post-conflict areas available for short-notice, short-term deployments during the initial phase of international missions. The third element is the *Civil Reserve Corps*. This pool will be utilized to recruit civilian personnel for long-term deployment. S/CRS is planning to identify c.3,000 reservists within the next three years for the Civil Reserve Corps. Rule-of-law experts will form a major component of these experts: police officers, including planners, investigators, and border control officers; judiciary personnel such as judges, prosecutors and judicial administrators; and corrections officers. S/CRS is also looking into the possibility of turning a part of the Civil Reserve Corps into a standing force on the model of the Australian Federal Police.



***Michael Dziedzic***

***Senior Researcher, Research and Studies,  
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)***

I would like to use this opportunity to introduce a project that will be launched in early 2007 by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in partnership with the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG). The *International Network to Promote the Rule of Law* (INPROL) is a consortium of practitioners linked together in their efforts to develop the human capacity and intellectual resources required to promote the rule of law in countries transitioning from war to peace. INPROL seeks to turn "lessons learned" from previous experience about promoting the rule of law into lessons that are actually applied. As an internet-based network it provides those serving in the field with the ability to exchange information with other experienced practitioners as well as access to relevant documents, best practices, and related materials. The network seeks to foster a holistic and integrated approach to the rule of law by incorporating all professional communities involved, including, but not limited to, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, senior police officials, stability police commanders, correction officials, legal advisors and monitors, and judicial administrators.

INPROL membership consists of many of the international community's most experienced professionals, and its advisory board includes global leaders in the field. The network is open to those currently serving in a rule-of-law related capacity or those who have previously done so, as well as scholars and others with specialized expertise of relevance to this community. Prospective members must be nominated by a current INPROL member.

The INPROL website ([www.inprol.org](http://www.inprol.org)) currently provides discussion fora for three communities of practitioners: general rule of law, senior police commanders, and stability police commanders. Members may send mission-related queries to the expert facilitators who serve each of these communities. They will receive a consolidated response incorporating member feedback and the results of research into relevant practices and scholarship on the issue. These facilitated discussion forums enable members to ask and answer questions and share important developments in the field. The discussions are archived, searchable and consolidated into a usable body of knowledge.

A digital library provides access to primary documents including laws, assessments and operating plans, handbooks, training materials, and annotated links to other available resources. Keyword searches of the digital library are enabled by an online peace and security thesaurus to ensure targeted and efficient search results. Country-specific pages will serve as a repository of information accessible to people serving on the ground and especially those newly deployed into that environment. INPROL also provides information about upcoming rule-of-law related events and a job board for vacant rule-of-law positions.

## **Klaus Peter Joerdening**

***Secretariat for International Police Missions,  
German Federal Ministry of the Interior***

In 1989 German police officers took part in an international police mission for the first time the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. It was expected to be an exceptional case. Today the deployment of more than 5,000 German police officers in 22 different international police missions proves that this challenge has become a permanent task. Since 2003, Germany has committed 910 police officers to the European Civil Crisis Management (CCM).

With a standardized procedure—set up by the federal police and the 16 state police forces—Germany has met its responsibility to recruit qualified police officers; recruitment occurs on a voluntary basis.

### **Assessment and Pre-Mission Training**

The training program undergone by police officers is as follows:

- Decentralized selection process, medical examination
- Centralized generic peacekeeping training (one week)
- Centralized mission-specific peacekeeping training (one week)
- Mission (usually one year)
- Centralized mission debriefing (one week)

The pre-mission training is divided into two parts. The two weeks generic peacekeeping training takes place in one of three national training centers. It is composed in a similar way to a mission tour—i.e. at speed—in order to impart basic knowledge. At the same time, the participants have to prove that they possess the necessary capabilities including language skills, police-specific knowledge and intercultural competences. Close to the mission-start the selected volunteers have to complete one week of mission-specific training,

which provides current information from the prospective operational area as well as special health care advices.

Since the German pre-mission training is compatible with EU-standards, it also possible for foreign participants to attend. The main result is that multinational pre-mission training affords favorable opportunities for fostering a common understanding of mission aims and tasks. International capabilities for implementing common pre-mission trainings should be strengthened in order to avoid varying standards of preparation.

### **Organization**

In addition to the 275 German police officers currently deployed in ten international police missions, there are also several others on duty for different tasks in international matters. The national police organization does not offset this international engagement properly, so every police officer abroad causes a gap at home. In order to reduce such deficiencies, it would be ideal to create mission-dedicated positions in the organization. Bearing in mind the limits of available resources and budgets, this can only be achieved in a compromised way with the ordinary duties at home.

### **Rapid Deployment (X + 30)**

The EU CCM earmarked 1,000 of the 5,000 assigned police officers for potential deployment within 30 days. Germany's contribution of 90 police officers is assured by a permanently updated personnel roster. The registered volunteers continue to work in their home offices, but officer and station are prepared for the eventuality that a mission will start immediately.

**Formed Police Unit (FPU)**

Germany established a first FPU dedicated to standby-police-operations at home and abroad. This unit is—like all German police officers are—only deployable under civilian command and is organized in accordance with the relevant EU-concept principally to perform executive police tasks.

**Peter Miller**

***Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and former Police Commissioner in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)***

Due to its relatively small population and correspondingly small number of police officers, Canada has seldom been able to contribute large numbers of police officers since our first involvement in an international peace operation in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989. However, the Canadian Federal Government has recently taken steps to strengthen our capabilities by approving permanent funding to provide up to 200 Canadian Police Officers to international police missions.

At the same time, Canada has always concentrated on other ways to contribute to international efforts to establish the rule of law in post conflict societies, particularly in the field of capacity-building. In close cooperation with the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), we have attempted to close gaps identified in international policing capacities, such as the shortage of female and French-speaking police officers, by working with other contributing nations.

One very successful example is the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre's *West African Police Project*. The project was conceived as a means of strengthening the capacity of West African states and particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to provide leadership to civilian police missions by reviewing national police structures and supporting the delivery of training courses. Due to the growing demand for police participation in peace operations in Africa and around the world we are currently looking into the possibility of extending the project to certain Central African and Maghreb states.

In addition, at the request of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre has initiated the *South Africa*

*Civilian Police Project* in partnership with the South Africa Police Service (SAPS). The project has been developed to meet the needs of the SAPS and is based upon a needs assessment conducted by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in South Africa. It is focused on four core areas that were developed by the SAPS: the SAPS management of peace operations; the provisioning of civilian police training; gender mainstreaming for peace operations; and strategic planning.

## **Justine Saunders**

***Police Advisor, International Deployment Group,  
Australian Federal Police, Australian Mission to the UN***

The establishment of the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG) was announced by the Prime Minister of Australia in February 2004. The IDG currently accounts for approximately one third of the AFP's budget. However, it is still growing as a result of the Government's announcement that it will expand the IDG to 1,200 staff at a cost of AUD\$500 million over five years.

The rationale for this growth is to enable the AFP to establish a sustainable model for the rapid deployment of personnel overseas in order to support the stability of Australia's neighboring countries, strengthen law enforcement capabilities across the region and increase the region's capacity to combat transnational crime. The expansion will ensure that the AFP has the capacity to undertake current and future demands and minimize the impact on other core business.

## **Recruitment**

The AFP acknowledges the importance of familiarity with the environment and recruiting staff with the right skill sets. The AFP has recognized the need to balance technical police skills with mentoring, coaching, and knowledge transfer and acquisition skills to meet the demands of capacity-building missions. As a result, the IDG team consists of personnel from both sworn and enabling components of the AFP and police officers from the State and Territory police services, as well as from countries of the Pacific Islands.

To ensure that the State and Territory Police can continue to fulfill their domestic responsibilities, the AFP has worked cooperatively to



develop funding arrangements as well as terms and conditions which meet the common requirements of the contributing agencies and the AFP. Critical to our success has been the recruitment of good leaders who will implement ongoing evaluations of performance and the reformulation of approaches to capacity-building in keeping with changing local circumstances.

### **Structure**

The support structure provides operational, administrative, logistical, health, welfare, training and planning capabilities for the maintenance of overseas missions. The structure has also been recently enhanced with the addition of capacity-building and doctrine-development teams.

### **Training**

The IDG is continually evaluating its training regime and implements new learning and development methods. The pre-deployment training provided remains a scenario-driven, experimental learning program. The program has recently been enhanced with the involvement of host country police officers in cultural-awareness training. This strategy also serves as a valuable capacity-building secondment for the police officers involved.

In addition to an increased focus on cultural awareness the AFP is enhancing training in language skills and developing a specific senior leadership course for peace operations offshore.

## **Dai Demao**

***Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China***

At the outset, since it's my first time to take the floor, I would like to express my gratitude to the hosts of this Workshop, the Center for International Peace Operations and the Federal Foreign Office of Germany for their hospitality, and also to thank them for giving me this chance to add my input on this topic.

Peace Operations have played an increasingly important role in maintaining regional stability and world peace. They are in accordance with the spirit of the UN Charter, reinforce the importance of taking collective international measures and win prestige for the practice of multilateralism. In the nearly 60 years since their inception, peace operations have achieved much all around the world. We can see so many successful examples, ranging from Cambodia to the Democratic Republic of Congo, from Sierra Leone to Liberia.

In this process, policing has played a greater and greater role, whether in the phase of conflict-prevention, peacekeeping or peacebuilding. It has vital influence in security sector reform, DDR, election monitoring, etc. It is also very important for the post-conflict country to restore its stability and order.

However, policing is expected to achieve more. It still faces quite a lot of challenges, namely:

- How best policing can cooperate with the military and the civilian?
- How to improve the unsatisfactory *status quo* of capacity-building in policing?

In the course of the Workshop, my colleagues have put forward many useful suggestions with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the

policing. After careful study, I would like to make a few additional points:

- A clear mandate is the basis for a successful mission. Blurring in some resolutions of the Security Council would undermine the effectiveness of the peace operation, including the policing. Therefore, it is advisable for the Security Council to articulate the mandates as distinctly and in as much detail as possible.
- Cooperation and coordination among all sectors is indispensable. When we study the cases of different missions, we reach the same conclusion: military, policing and civilian components count on and complement each other. The establishment of proper mechanisms among all sectors both in the headquarters and missions is to be recommended.
- More effort is required in capacity-building. Sometimes we fail not due to a lack of will, but due to the lack of capabilities. We do recognize that this is a long march, which needs our unremitting and concerted efforts. Our priority should be set to strengthen the capabilities of some Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and local authorities. The police in the mission should attach more importance to building the capacity of the local police.

China is fairly new to policing in peace operations Timor-Leste in 2000 being the first case. However, we are enthusiastic and willing to participate more, both in numbers and scale. Up to now, besides the Timor-Leste mission, 889 Chinese police officers have served or are serving in 5 UN missions, including those in Liberia (UNMIL), Kosovo (UNMIK), Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Sudan (UNMIS). Their tasks include riot control, maintaining order and training the local police. We have established an advanced CIVPOL training center and conducted fruitful cooperation with other countries as well as with the UN. China will continue to devote itself to this course in the future.

We operate in an era in which peace and stability are our first priority. The responsibility of maintaining peace is a collective one, and the peace operation has proved to be the best means. This Workshop provided us with such a good platform upon which to share our experience and knowledge. I believe recommendations generated from this Workshop will facilitate more effective policing.

**Colonel Fausto Rossi**

***Chief, Studies and Research Department,  
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)***

I am glad to take this opportunity to present the work of CoESPU, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, established on 1 March 2005 in Vicenza. The origin of CoESPU lies in the activities of the G8. In June 2002, during their summit at Kananaskis in Canada, the G8 nations exhibited particular concern about the increasing threats to the stability of the African continent. One year later, at Evian in France, the G8 followed up on this issue and finally, at their summit at Sea Island, USA last year, they launched the *G8 Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations*.

To expand the global crisis management capability, otherwise known as the *Global Peace Operations Initiative* (GPOI), the countries convening at Sea Island pledged to "provide technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African countries as well as regional and sub-regional organizations are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter". They decided to undertake specific activities, in accordance with the UN Charter, aimed at training and—if required—equipping, a total of 75,000 military troops worldwide by 2010. The military force should include a police component approximately estimated at about 10% of the peacekeepers' total strength.

In that context, they acknowledged the increasing demand for police missions and for a higher number of interoperable units. Additionally, the Action Plan approved at Sea Island commits its progenitors to increase coordination with the UN, the EU and African partners such as the AU.

The Global Peace Operations Initiative acknowledges that this is a bold enterprise requiring a long-term commitment and significant financial backing in order to fulfill its goals of regional peace. Although current or upcoming peacekeeping missions in Africa will not benefit from this initiative, it does aim to create a capacity that can be utilized by the UN.

According to the G8 Action Plan, CoESPU has to:

- operate training programs
- provide interoperability training with the relevant military forces
- develop a common doctrine and common operational procedures, and
- interact with academic and research institutions.

CoESPU was conceived as both a doctrinal hub and a training center with the aim of creating a capacity that can be utilized by the UN in accordance with their project to "Expand Police Capacities" as well as by other international organizations. In order to facilitate the achievement of this goal, CoESPU has been built upon a multinational basis. From the beginning, it has been open to significant foreign contributions, allowing it to garner the best expertise and promote the lessons learned from different experiences.

As mentioned before, it has been estimated that the specialized police component of a peace support operation should be about 10% of all deployed forces, so that by 2010 the global strength of Stability Police Units around the world shall be not less than 7,500, according to the G8 Action Plan. It has been planned that approximately 3,000 will be individually trained at CoESPU in Vicenza, while all the others will have to receive specialized training by formed units in the respective force contributing countries, possibly supported by CoESPU Mobile Assistance Teams as appropriate and if requested.

CoESPU courses are tailored to two different levels of trainees: High Level and Middle Management. The *High Level Course* has been designed for senior officers from Major to Colonel (or equivalent civilian ranks). Each class has 40 students, and the training program lasts five weeks and is held four times a year. The *Middle Management Course* addresses young officers and senior Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) or equivalent civilians. There are two classes of 50 students each. The Course lasts seven weeks and it is held five times a year.

In this first year of activity, we have held three High Level Courses and four Middle Management Courses. Additionally, in conjunction with the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), we have hosted two Seminars for UN FPU Commanders and Commissioners. Next year we plan to hold four High Level Courses and five Middle Management Courses. The last High and Middle Management Courses will be held in French.

To conclude, our priorities are:

- to adopt a comprehensive doctrine for achieving and promoting improved interoperability in order to avoid law enforcement and procedural gaps;
- to educate, to support and to monitor local police forces in order to reach an international standard of efficiency;
- to play a significant role in the development of an internet website dedicated to Stability Police Units (International Network to Promote the Rule of Law—INPROL), updated and managed by CoESPU, where it will be possible to disseminate doctrine, works, lessons learned, news, etc;
- to dispatch Mobile Assistance Teams (MATs).

To expand upon the last of these points: MATs are a tool to provide support to partner countries in order to realize the follow-up these countries have committed themselves to undertake after the training courses at CoESPU. Two MATs have already been sent to India and Jordan and others are planned to be sent to Cameroon, Kenya and Senegal.

Additionally, other teams will be sent to new CoESPU candidate countries with the task of identifying the suitable partners possessing the relevant skill, expertise and professional background to attend the courses. In particular, it is important to highlight the specific responsibility retained by the member countries of organizing and establishing their own Stability Police Units using those officers trained at CoESPU once they return to their home countries.

Finally, MATs will be made available on request of countries to be dispatched with assistance tasks towards national police forces in training of Stability Police Units; besides that, MATs will work in synergy with their counterparts to share respective procedures in terms of operational planning, standardization of equipment, as well as to support national training centers in the updating and adjustment of course curricula in accordance with the emerging stability police unit doctrine and requirements.

The concept of Stability Police Units is still evolving. For this reason, doctrines still have to be harmonized and/or integrated. Given the increasing number of international police missions, the international community clearly needs new contributors. To this end, CoESPU can:

- serve as the focal point for harmonizing current Stability Police Unit doctrine;
- develop doctrine in areas where gaps exist;



- maintain a repository for lessons learned responding to queries from police commanders in the field as part of the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL);
- support pre-deployment and in-theatre training exercises.

**Lt. Colonel Thierry Baud**  
***EU Police Unit, General Secretariat EU,***  
***Council of the European Union***

The European Security and Defense Policy has been making significant headway in the management of crises over the past few years. Although the EU is a relative newcomer in the field of crisis management, it is becoming a greater stakeholder, having launched 16 civilian and military ESDP operations and missions in the short time since 2003. The EU is developing a comprehensive, global and holistic approach to crisis-management within the framework of its three pillar structure. It has the capacity to rely not only on the Pillar II instruments (Common Foreign and Security Policy) including ESDP military and civilian components but also on Pillar I Community projects carried out in crisis areas. It is seeking increased cooperation with Pillar III (Justice and Home Affairs) as well.

As part of the development of its ESDP capabilities, the EU is, *inter alia*, striving to significantly enhance its rapid-deployment capability in order to be in a position to bring to bear a quick security response to an emerging crisis. This is notably true in the policing area where the EU's efforts aim at helping to fill the so-called "law-enforcement gap" at the outset of a crisis when very often only the military is deployed.

Together with the development of those rapidly deployable police elements, the EU is also building up military and other civilian capabilities in order to promote an approach to crisis management that is integrated as much as possible and makes use of all its available tools.

**Development of ESDP civilian capabilities**

As regards the ESDP civilian remit, the Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 was endorsed by the European Council in December 2004 in

order to guide EU capability development in line with the ambition set out in the European Security Strategy and to make sure that the EU is capable at any time to meet concrete operational requirements. According to the CHG 2008, the EU "must be equipped to conduct several civilian ESDP crisis management missions concurrently, calling on different capabilities, including at least one large civilian substitution mission at short notice in a non-benign environment."

In this context, the EU is improving its rapid-deployment-police capability and is setting up civilian response teams.

### **Rapidly Deployable Police Elements**

Within the framework of the capabilities commitment whereby over 5,700 EU police officers have been pledged by EU Member States for ESDP missions, 1,400 of them are likely to be dispatched to an area of operation in their rapid deployment capacity within 30 days. The bulk of the rapidly deployable capacity would mainly consist of Integrated Police Units (IPUs) and Formed Police Units (FPUs) but also of specialized teams and individual police officers.

The IPUs are police components with robust, rapidly deployable, flexible and interoperable forces; they can perform the whole spectrum of executive police tasks, in order to be able to intervene in complex scenarios and to first deploy in the non-stabilized or fragile state situations. At the Nice European Council (7-9 December 2000) it was decided that the IPUs, subject to the EU member states' national rules and legislation, may be placed temporarily under the responsibility of the military authority entrusted with the protection of the population and so included in a military peace support operation chain of command.

The FPUs can only be deployed under a civilian chain of command. They can be defined as police units that are constituted by integrating

several smaller-sized units from one or more of the member states, and which should be rapidly deployable, flexible, interoperable and able to perform executive police tasks.

The National Expert Teams are pre-established groups which are trained and equipped to undertake specific specialized tasks or a set of tasks in the Specialized Elements and/or in the EU Police Headquarters.

Operating in multinational teams, meanwhile, individual police officers can be deployed at the initial stage of a crisis mainly in the EU Police Headquarters in order to plan and prepare those police activities to be carried out by the strengthening element in the stabilization stage, and in administrative and logistic tasks.

### **Civilian Response Teams (CRTs)**

Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) are a civilian rapid deployment capability of flexible size and composition, developed in 2006, within the framework of the CHG 2008. The CHG aims at increasing the rapid-reaction capacity of the EU, contributing to the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU's crisis-management response as well as to its coherence with other actors. CRTs are thus typically multidisciplinary and multinational.

They can be used for three purposes: for assessment and fact-finding before any decisions on an EU operation are taken, for mission build-up and initial presence, and to support ongoing ESDP operations. Besides the general CRT-concept, detailed mobilization and deployment procedures and a comprehensive training concept have been established.

In the course of 2006, a pool of 83 CRT experts from EU member states was identified and trained. The pool members cover eight fields of

expertise: police, rule of law, civilian administration, civil protection, human rights, political affairs, monitoring, and mission support (administration/logistics). A CRT can be mobilized within five days and is projected to stay in the field for up to three months.

### **Rapidly Deployable Military Elements**

With a view to improving the overall response time to a crisis, the EUMC (European Union Military Committee) agreed, in January 2003, to the EU Military Rapid Response Concept. The objective is to have packages of forces and capabilities, possibly combined and joint, tailored for a specific task and at very high readiness (available and deployable at very short notice).

### **Battle Groups (BG)**

The BG is a specific form of the rapid response effort, and constitutes a move towards the timely provision of the necessary capabilities for an EU-led Crisis Management Operation (CMO) requiring a rapid response. The BG is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force-package capable of stand-alone operations, or suitable for the initial phase of larger operations. It would have in its generic composition a strength of around 1,500 troops and would require specific guidance to tailor it for one particular mission in advance. Under specific circumstances, if the mission so requires, it can include an IPU (Integrated Police Unit) which would then be temporarily placed under the military responsibility.



## Closing Remarks

**Peter Wittig**

*Director-General for the United Nations and Global Issues,  
German Federal Foreign Office*

It was repeatedly said that many critical issues brought up during our discussions were not new. They had been known for years and nothing had changed. Still, I believe that it was good to display such problems once more in this forum—along with issues where some progress has been achieved.

For our purposes in the Federal Foreign Office I would like to draw the following conclusions:

- The most pressing issue to settle for future peace operations is a coherent or integrated executive operation of the military and the police starting at the highest echelons of command. From my viewpoint, improvement in this respect requires a standard operational setup that should be drafted by the UN DPKO and the EU respectively. A common vision of both would, of course, be desirable. Another main obstacle to be overcome seems to be the mindset of police and military—it's a long-term challenge: it must be clear to everyone on board, that there is no competition within peace operations. There is only a common endeavor.
- A second important issue is training. I take it from the last two days that there are great differences in standards of pre-mission preparation of police officers. I also understand that there exist as many different training standards as police training centers that cater for peacekeeping missions. Therefore, in my view, we might need a more dense and stable network of coordination for

these training centers, and pre-mission training needs to be an investment to be provided by all police contributors—be it in their own facilities or in those of a country nearby.

- As I had already mentioned in my introductory statement, and as many interventions during the last two days have confirmed, the 'law and order triad' has to be part of the initial mission planning for police operations, or better: rule-of-law operations. The police alone can only achieve results within their traditional scope of work. Not having a functioning court system or a lack of capacities, and not having a stable and acceptable penitentiary system will seriously backfire on any successful police operation.
- Mission planning and preparation seems to be not fully satisfactory according to some statements in this forum. Expertise on the organizational requirements of a police component in a peacekeeping mission needs to be brought in the very early stages of setting up a mission mandate. In this respect, I am confident that the new 'Standing Police Capacity' of the United Nations, once it becomes operative early next year, can take a good share in improving this aspect.

Let me add a closing remark in my national capacity. Germany is fully aware of the increasing importance of police missions in modern, multidimensional international peace operations. We have taken the political decision to provide important police contingents in major international missions in Africa, the Middle East, in the Black Sea region and, primarily, in the Balkans. Germany has constantly improved its pre-mission training programs and is now providing training capacities to foreign partners, too. We will remain committed to meeting our responsibility in this aspect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.



## Acronyms

AFP	Australian Federal Police
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
APRC	Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing
BG	Battle Group
CCM	Civil Crisis Management
CHG	Civilian Headline Goal
CMO	Crisis Management Operation
CoESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DoJ	Department of Justice
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EU BAM Rafah	European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUPM	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL PROXIMA	European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
FFI	Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

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FPU	Formed Police Unit
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
IDG	International Deployment Group
IMU	International Monitoring Unit
INPROL	International Network to Promote the Rule of Law
IPU	Integrated Police Unit
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
KBP	Kosovo Border Police
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KPSS	Kosovo Police Service School
MAT	Mobile Assistance Team
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MINUSTA	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PA	Palestinian Authority
PILPG	Public International Law and Policy Group

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PKSOI	US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RoEs	Rules of Engagement
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SAPS	South Africa Police Service
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIK-P	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo—Police
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
ZIF	Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze/Center for International Peace Operations

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